Re: Can mind be a computation if physics is fundamental?

From: Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2009 09:22:18 +0200

On 13 Aug 2009, at 02:42, Colin Hales wrote:

> It starts with the simple posit that if COMP is true then all
> differences between a COMP world (AC) and the natural world (NC)
> should be zero under all circumstances and the AC/NC distinction
> would be false.



The difference between natural and artificial is artificial, and thus
natural: all machines will tend to do it.




> That is the natural result of unconditional universality of COMP yes?



I don't think so. If comp is true (if I am a machine), then nature, of
whatever I am not, cannot be described entirely as a machine.




> The place where we get an informal system is in the human brain,
> which can 'symbolically cohere and explore' any/all formal systems.
> I specifically chose the human brain of a scientist, the workings of
> which were used to generate the 'law of nature' running the
> artificial (COMP) scientist (who must also be convinced COMP is true
> in order to bother at all!).


I have no clues about what you are trying to say. Obviously if the
human brain is not a machine, nature can't be described as a machine.
It seems you assume what you want to show.
Also, if comp is true, no entities at all can ever be convinced that
comp is true. Cf the needed act of faith.

No problem with your conclusion, given that you postulate a primitive
(I guess) natural world, it follows from UDA.
But I don't see the reasoning.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Received on Thu Aug 13 2009 - 09:22:18 PDT

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