Re: Can mind be a computation if physics is fundamental?

From: Bruno Marchal <>
Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2009 17:24:46 +0200

Hi Peter,

>> Bruno's "comp" is something rather different and idiosyncratic
> You keep saying this. This is a lie.

  I am not yet entirely sure of this. Let me correct my statement by
saying that this is just a common lie, similar to those who have been
made purposefully in the seventies, and repeated since then by people
who even brag on this in some private circles, as it has been reported
to me more than 20 times (since 1973).

You have stated in this list many times recurrently that I assume
platonism without ever telling us why you think so, or what texts
makes you think so.

Recently you have make the "progress" to attribute me only, now, an
implicit assumption of platonism. That is a progress, because it means
you have eventually realize that I am not making that assumption
explicitly, and that what I call Arithmetical Realism is a much weaker
statement. Good.

But you still seems to want to attribute me platonism as an implicit

That is not enough to refute an argument. If you believe sincerely
that I am using an implicit assumption of platonism in the UDA
reasoning, you have to show us where in the reasoning the assumption
is implicitly used.

If you dismiss this, you look like those materialist computationalist
who just assume there is an error because the result contradict their
theory, and then don't take the time to even read the argument.

That is not a scientific attitude. It is an appeal to dogma. It
prevents serious people searching some possible "real" mistakes or
awkwardness in the reasoning.

Sorry for having to make such remark. But it is highly confusing for
everybody when people ascribes to other people the product of their
own imagination, especially in difficult and new domains (new to
scientific attitude).

At least you do it publicly, which makes me think you could still be
"not lying", but only under the spell of materialist wishful thinking.

Bruno Marchal

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Received on Mon Aug 10 2009 - 17:24:46 PDT

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