2009/8/7 Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>:
>>>> If it isn;t RITSIAR, it cannot be generating me. Mathematical
>>>> proofs only prove mathematical "existence", not onltolgical
>>>> existence. For a non-Platonist , 23 "exists" mathematically,
>>>> but is not RITSIAR. The same goes for the UD
>>>
>>> Is an atom RITSIAR? Is a quark RITSIAR?
>>
>> If current physics is correct.
>
>
> Then it is not "RITSIAR" in the sense of the discussion with David.
> Real in the sense that "I" am real. is ambiguous.
> Either the "I" refers to my first person, and then I have ontological
> certainty.
> As I said on FOR, I can conceive that I wake up and realize that
> quark, planet, galaxies and even my body were not real. I cannot
> conceive that I wake up and realize that my consciousness is not real.
> Ontological first person does not need an "IF this or that theory is
> correct".
> You are reifying theoretical constructions.
I think need to take a hard line on RITSIAR. I feel that the key lies
in what Bruno terms the certainty of the ontological first person
(OFP): i.e. the sine qua non of reality as it is uniquely available to
us. Since this is inescapably the foundation of any and all
judgements whatsoever, it is simultaneously both the both point of
departure and the 'what-is-to-be-explained' of RITSIAR. In this light
it becomes self-evident that any and all explanatory entities -
physical, computational, or whatever - are severely restricted to the
domain of epistemology. IOW - as Bruno says above - they are
theoretical constructions.
So far so obvious. But - as has again been recognised immemorially -
solipsism is a dead-end and hence we seek a theory to capture the
relation between the OFP and its environment. But immediately we are
faced with the notorious 'explanatory gap', and it seems to me that
its most precise expression is in the gap between ontology and
epistemology. Indeed, what conceivable strategy could raise these
theoretical constructions - to which the OFP uniquely lends existence
- to the ontological certainty of their host? Is there a coherent way
to conceive what it could mean to *be* a theoretical entity (as
opposed to postulating or observing one)? There is something
quintessential that stubbornly eludes capture, because epistemological
access never tells us what an entity *is* - only what can be
ascertained of its 'externalised' properties. And lest we be tempted
to accept the sum of these properties as exhausting 'existence', we
need only turn to the self-evident corrective of the OFP.
So the gap must remain, and I think that now I see why Bruno appeals
simply to the 'ordinary' mathematical sense of existence - because
COMP, under this analysis, is an epistemological schema, and its
entities are theoretical constructions. Hence the question of jumping
the ontological gap is in abeyance, perhaps permanently, but in any
case in the realm of faith. And if this is true for COMP, then
mutatis mutandis it is true for physics. It's no use appealing to
notions of 'what it's like to be a brain' - nor what it's like to be a
COMP-quale - because we can never say that it is 'like anything to be'
the stuff of epistemology. Hence we must see our theorising and
observing - in physical, computational, or whatever terms - *in
relation* to ontological certainty, not as constitutive of it. This
necessarily weakens what can be ascertained by theory or by
observation, but at least keeps us honest.
The unavoidable consequence of the foregoing is that atoms, quarks and
numbers cannot be RITSIAR. Rather, they stand in some theoretical
relation to RITSIAR, but strictly on the epistemological side of the
explanatory gap. They are 'real as far as theory takes us', or if
further jargon is unavoidable: RAFATTU.
>>> The point is just that IF you survive "in the RITSIAR" sense, with a
>>> digital (even material, if you want) brain, then materiality has to
>>> be
>>> retrieved by coherence or gluing property of immaterial computation,
>>> or there is an error in the UD Argument.
>>
>>
>> It is not clear what you mean by that. If I am transferred from a
>> phsycial
>> brain into a physcial computer, physicalism is unscathed. Your
>> argument
>> against physcialism is that is unnecessary because something else
>> is doing the work --
>
> My argument is not that. From what you say, I infer that you
> understand the seven first steps of the UD-Argument.
> You seem to have a problem with the 8th step, which is the step
> showing that no "work" is needed at all. The usual number relations do
> the work, and this without any need to reify them.
See above.
>> But you have to assume Platonism to get your UDA, so you have to
>> assume Platonism to refute physicalism. Without that assumption, the
>> rest doesn't follow.. It is step 0.
>
> Do I need platonism to believe in the existence of prime numbers? I
> need only the amount of arithmetical realism for saying that the
> (mathematical) machine x stop or doesn't stop on input y. This is
> enough for the computational supervenience. And physical supervenience
> does not work, as the step 08 of UDA shows.
And again.
> It is a relief for me to see that you did look at the papers, and
> realise I do not postulate platonism, only realism. So now you have to
> attribute this assumption as an implicit assumption. I'm afraid that
> such an implicit assumption exists only in your imagination.
> You reify a physical primitive reality to instantiate consciousness,
> and you attribute me a reification of the numbers to get the same, but
> the point of step 8 is to show that such a reification, be it with
> matter or number, cannot work.
My argument against the *physical* instantiation of a computational
mind (i.e. in any non-eliminative sense) rests on the claim that the
very arbitrariness of possible physical instantiations of a given
computation (cf Hofstadter) violates the criterion of direct
supervention on *specific* physical entities and relations from which
a class of emergent phenomena inherits physical - as opposed to merely
mental (and hence egregiously question-begging) - stability.
Naturally, all this is per physics as ordinarily understood.
Tolerating such a violation is tantamount to accepting (and this is
notoriously claimed by Hofstadter et al) that *any* arbitrarily
assembled set of physical entities deemed to be in the required
'functional' relation (e.g. - famously - in an anthill) necessarily
stabilises exactly the same 'mental state'. AFAICS this is by itself
quite sufficient to reveal such a 'mind' as intrinsically unphysical -
and a fortiori un-RITSIAR.
My argument assumes, however, that - per physicalism - a running
computation (as opposed to its specification) necessarily requires
*some* physical activity to transform inputs to outputs (e.g. in terms
of logic gates). Step 8, however, seems to take a step beyond this by
proposing that a running computation can take the form of (as opposed
to merely being described by) a machine *state*: i.e. without the
requirement of activity. But in precisely what sense can such a
'stopped' state (i.e. still within purely physical terms of reference)
be regarded as a 'running' computation, and hence - per computational
theory of mind - as evocative of temporal experience? And in any
case, in what way is step 8 intended to extend intuition beyond my own
argument, which - as I have tried to show - also elicits the insight
that the direct supervention of 'functional' relations on functions
themselves - not on their arbitrarily-defined physical tokens - is
central to the recovery of 'mind' from computation.
> You talk like if we knew that a primitive physical ontology exists,
> but we don't know that, and the seven first step are neutral on that.
> You are the one insisting that for consciousness to exist, we need a
> physical ontology. But the step 8 shows that with comp such a physical
> ontology, or any special ontology is spurious.
And again, the onto-epistemological gap.
David
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Received on Mon Aug 10 2009 - 01:59:17 PDT