2009/7/30 John Mikes <jamikes.domain.name.hidden>:
Hi John
Well, I'm equally moved that you have the motivation and interest to
read what I write! I'm uncomfortably aware that I often dump quite a
lump of verbiage at once, so do let me know whenever anything is
obscure. There's a narrow path between saying too much and too little
that's hard to tread. But essentially, I'm just proposing a context
in which you or I or anyone might think about just the kind of deeper
questions you pose, to see if they might possibly appear any less
paradoxical this way - or at least, to situate the remaining paradoxes
less discomfitingly! All I would ever ask - and of course this works
both ways - is your willingness to climb inside my model with an
attitude of "hmm.. what if?", take a look around from that
perspective, interrogate it by rethinking your queries in terms of it,
if that's possible, and then climb out again - none the worse, I
trust, for the experiment. Beyond this, only more questions, but with
luck perhaps a little differently shaped.
I'm off to Scotland at the weekend for a few days of hiking (taking my
Goretex!) so I probably won't be present much on the list during that
period, but I'll take a glance if I get an opportunity (i.e. if Mrs N
lets me anywhere near a computer).
David
> Hi, David,
> I am deeply moved that you spent so close a look at my questions - taking
> them seriously enough to reply in length and kind. I will re-re-reread your
> posts (more than just to me) and try to arrive at some readable response in
> 03 - 30 days<G> if I can.
> I don't promise to oppose, maybe in the contrary.
>
> For now:
> as I get older I detect more and more to be confused about. I find a
> generalization potential in terms used even today (I am weary of the great
> thinkers of the past, who looked at things in a reasonably smaller cognitive
> inventory and so could apply their extraordinary logic more freely (-
> unbiased by many 'facts') we think about today.)
> I think about 'information' as "sensed correlation of relations" -
> mixing in with 'consciousness', 'life', 'knowledge', even
> - with 'observation', all these terms riding in similar carriages. Any
> more specific term runs into inadequacies I cannot handle.
> I appreciate your 'image' of a wave requiring 'stuff' that may undulate.
>
> I think you disregarded my Q# >2. (what keeps it running?) and concentrated
> only of birth and death. Maybe there is NO 'run' in between, indeed?
> relations occur and disappear, in a preferred timeless view the 'process' or
> 'action' is our figment. Remember: I am fundamentally naive (by
> conventional, i.e. reductionistic natural science studies). But I try....
>
> Existence is a hard term, I accept it upon something YOU just think about:
> it 'exists' in your mind (whatever we assign to that).
>
> Self? (May I refer to the ONE and only Koan in Oriental Science I ever heard
> about: the one handed clapping.) I made a second one? (just for the fun of
> it): the "SELF" which is a relation of ONE to itself. I don'tgo for
> "reflexive": that requires and observer and so we just have met Mr
> Homunculus.
>
> I hope to return to this post with smarter reflections some time.
>
> John Mikes
>
>
> On Wed, Jul 29, 2009 at 11:52 AM, David Nyman <david.nyman.domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>>
>> 2009/7/28 John Mikes <jamikes.domain.name.hidden>:
>>
>> Hi John
>>
>> > I really do not expect from you to give adequate replies to all these
>> > questions - it would make the grandkids of our grandkits scientifically
>> > unemployed but you have unusual solutions and ideas and it may be
>> > interesting to tape your mind..
>>
>> Whew! But you are right about my inadequacies. Indeed I see my basic
>> task, as others before me, to witheringly expose the specific
>> inadequacies of my replies to any and all questions. To know less and
>> less with ever greater clarity is the journey and precisely-delineated
>> ignorance is the ultimate goal. In that spirit......
>>
>> > "Mind is what brain does" (although I find it a pars pro toto)
>> > I am questioning "does". Would we restrict it to our ongoing image of
>> > physiology, meaning: the brain does physical 'energy' consuming
>> > electrical
>> > changes by (physico/chemical) impact and by physiological changes (such
>> > as
>> > diffeences in blood-stream performance, chemical syntheses and migration
>> > of
>> > molecules) - or do we assign activities of some brain-image beyond
>> > today's
>> > anatomical biology?
>>
>> I'm pretty convinced that we're going to be stymied in much of this
>> until we find another schema in which to re-express a new set of
>> 'ultimates' for the purpose. You've seen the various ways I've tried
>> to pump people's intuitions about this, but it may be that how one
>> feels about it is ultimately characterologically influenced rather
>> than logically compulsive. However, I believe that we need a new
>> picture and a different language before the
>> physical-chemical-biological story you refer to above, and the
>> experiential, intentional narrative that we ignore at the cost of our
>> minds, can ever be reconciled satisfactorily. On this basis, my
>> interest in COMP is not because I know it to be correct, but rather
>> that it is the beginning of an attempt to recast the investigation in
>> these terms, which is VERY hard to discover elsewhere. In this regard
>> I should again note that Colin is working on his own approach on a
>> different basis but very much in the same spirit.
>>
>> > 1. What instigates the 'function' (called mindwork) - ostentibly with
>> > connection to our 'material-figment' BRAIN,
>>
>> In my various ramblings, I've tried to cut the whole Gordian knot of
>> what can coherently be said to exist, and within this the whole debate
>> on materialism, panpsychism, mind-body hard problems, causal closure
>> of the physical, etc. by a simple expediency which then struck me as
>> obviously true (how about that?). To re-state:
>>
>> 1) Is there some logically prior requirement for anything to be said
>> to exist? Reflect: 'something existing' necessitates presence not
>> absence.
>> 2) What is the relation between presence and "I"' as I discover
>> myself? Reflect: "I" discover myself to be present.
>> 3) Conjunction of 1) and 2): There is presence and it is reflexive.
>> This constitutes what can be said to exist, and discovers it to be
>> personal (i.e. there is an "I" associated with it).
>> 4) Is there some logically prior requirement to my 'knowing' anything?
>> Reflect: this and that must be distinguishable. In terms of the
>> foregoing, this necessitates reflexive encounter (i.e.
>> self-differentiation) This necessarily unites the senses of
>> 'perceive', 'intend' and 'act'.
>> 5) Conjunction of 1) - 4) "I" discover myself to be present through
>> reflexive encounter. I've called this 'getting-a-grip-on-Oneself.
>> This move now collapses being, knowing, perceiving, intending and
>> acting.
>>
>> That's it. But now we have all the prerequisites for not only
>> mindwork, but also matter-energy work, by this (as it seems to me)
>> simple recognition of a present and differentiable personal synthesis.
>> More: this very recognition now seems (to me at least) to be the
>> logically compelling prerequisite for any meaningful sense of
>> existence whatsoever. From this simplicity, by differentiation we can
>> achieve mental and material multiplicity without limit, sans any
>> crazy-making ontological separation of mind and body. The hard part
>> is the specifics of the correlation.
>>
>> > 2. What keeps it running (and please, save me from the marvel of
>> > physicists
>> > the call 'energy' - but nobody knows what it is)
>> > 3. Who tells the process to buzz off, it is done,
>>
>> Well, it will appear, disappear, and reappear as the manifestation of
>> patterns of self-encounter. Fundamentally, these patterns are not to
>> be distinguished into mind or matter, and this is crucial from the
>> necessary though limited perspective of causation, because it makes an
>> indivisible unity of perception, intention, and action central to the
>> logic of the story. Nonetheless it will be a requirement of local
>> narratives in the 'traditions' either of physiology or phenomenology
>> to deploy the appropriate metaphors plausibly and to give intuitively
>> graspable answers to your the questions.
>>
>> > 4. How does the 'product' incorporate into the rest of it?
>> > (BTW these questions arise in 'functions','reactions',processes as well,
>> > if
>> > we think beyond Physix Textbook 101).
>>
>> Ah, the product is of course yet another aspect of being/knowing.
>> IOW, we exist as mini-mes within perspectival horizons that limit us
>> to mindworlds that nonetheless continue seamlessly in relation beyond
>> those horizons. The mindworld by the arguments presented above
>> constitutes both our being and our knowledge. There is not (cannot
>> logically be) any observer and hence (unfortunately for Copenhagen
>> interpretations) no observation. Reflect on the neonate: no
>> differentiation of self and other has yet occurred. But through a
>> sort of inferred video game system of feedback, the "I" polarises to a
>> complementary subjective pole, forcing the rest of the mindworld to
>> the objective 'externalised' extreme, wherein characterisations of
>> 'functions', 'reactions', 'processes' in terms of causality are
>> distinctively 'active' rather than 'intentional'. Hence you may see
>> how all reality and all delusion stem from this survival reaction.
>>
>> > 5. Is a "thought" a product of the mind-process? if so, where does it
>> > settle
>> > to become consciously acknowledged for us... (for WHOM???)
>>
>> Well, I pursue my line of argument, and from this perspective thought
>> is a distinguishable modality of our mindworld - IOW a distinguishable
>> aspect at once of our being and our knowing. And for whom? Well,
>> I've been badgering Bruno on this very topic more than somewhat, but
>> again my line is that the 'whom' is the reflexively present global "I"
>> derived above, limited to mini-mes by perspectival horizons and pushed
>> to a subjective pole by the inexorable requirements of a
>> biological/evolutionary narrative. You're entitled to claim on this
>> basis, as mini-me at any rate, that you are merely the master of all
>> you survey, but that couldn't be the case if in fact you weren't at
>> the same time heir to the whole ball of wax.
>>
>> David
>>
>> > David,
>> > this question of mine is not within the ongoing discussion-details, just
>> > 'about' the ideas exposed in them.
>> >
>> > "Mind is what brain does" (although I find it a pars pro toto)
>> > I am questioning "does". Would we restrict it to our ongoing image of
>> > physiology, meaning: the brain does physical 'energy' consuming
>> > electrical
>> > changes by (physico/chemical) impact and by physiological changes (such
>> > as
>> > diffeences in blood-stream performance, chemical syntheses and migration
>> > of
>> > molecules) - or do we assign activities of some brain-image beyond
>> > today's
>> > anatomical biology?
>> > In the first case 'mind' is physical, memory, thought, mentality is as
>> > of
>> > yesterday and we can stop perspective research. Slowly return to
>> > faithful
>> > creationism.
>> > If we believe in further enrichment of our cognitive inventory, I
>> > question:
>> > 1. What instigates the 'function' (called mindwork) - ostentibly with
>> > connection to our 'material-figment' BRAIN,
>> > 2. What keeps it running (and please, save me from the marvel of
>> > physicists
>> > the call 'energy' - but nobody knows what it is)
>> > 3. Who tells the process to buzz off, it is done, and
>> > 4. How does the 'product' incorporate into the rest of it?
>> > (BTW these questions arise in 'functions','reactions',processes as well,
>> > if
>> > we think beyond Physix Textbook 101).
>> > 5. Is a "thought" a product of the mind-process? if so, where does it
>> > settle
>> > to become consciously acknowledged for us... (for WHOM???)
>> >
>> > I really do not expect from you to give adequate replies to all these
>> > questions - it would make the grandkids of our grandkits scientifically
>> > unemployed but you have unusual solutions and ideas and it may be
>> > interesting to tape your mind...
>> >
>> > You mentioned below the 'mind-body' problem. Considering 'body' as part
>> > of
>> > the figment of the 'physical world' and 'mind' something more than just
>> > that, I see an old artifax of a problem, how to save obsolescence into
>> > advancement.
>> > I am not ready to go into that.
>> >
>> > John Mikes
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > On Mon, Jul 27, 2009 at 7:34 PM, David Nyman <david.nyman.domain.name.hidden>
>> > wrote:
>> >>
>> >> 2009/7/27 Brent Meeker <meekerdb.domain.name.hidden>
>> >>
>> >> > That's a bit of a straw man you're refuting. I've never heard anyone
>> >> > claim that
>> >> > the mind is the brain. The materialist claim is that the mind is
>> >> > what
>> >> > the
>> >> > brain does, i.e. the mind is a process. That's implicit in COMP, the
>> >> > idea that
>> >> > functionally identical units can substituted for parts of your brain
>> >> > without any
>> >> > untoward effects.
>> >>
>> >> Yes indeed. But what do we mean by a process in materialist ontology?
>> >> To speak of what the brain 'does' is to refer to actual changes of
>> >> state of physical elements - at whatever arbitrary level you care to
>> >> define them - of the material object in question. So now you have two
>> >> options: either the 'process' is just an added-on description of these
>> >> material changes of state, and hence redundant or imaginary in any
>> >> ontological sense, or else you are implicitly claiming a second -
>> >> non-material - ontological status for the mind-process so invoked. As
>> >> I said, it would be difficult to imagine two states of being more
>> >> different than minds and brains (i.e. this is the classic mind-body
>> >> dilemma).
>> >>
>> >> This is the insight in Bruno's requirement of the COMP reversal of
>> >> physics and mind as described in step 08 of his SANE2004 paper. It's
>> >> aim is to deal a knockdown blow to any facile intuition of the mind as
>> >> the computation (i.e. process) of a material brain, and IMO the
>> >> argument more than merits a direct riposte in that light.
>> >> Furthermore, in a platonic COMP, the question of the level of
>> >> substitution required to reproduce your mind is unprovable, and has to
>> >> be an act of faith in any 'doctor' who claims to know.
>> >>
>> >> AFAICS, until these 'under-the-carpet' issues are squarely faced, the
>> >> customary waving away of the brain-mind relation as a simplistic
>> >> functional identity remains pure materialist prejudice, and on the
>> >> basis of the above, flatly erroneous. To say the least, any such
>> >> relation is moot, absent a radically deeper insight into the mind-body
>> >> problem.
>> >>
>> >> David
>> >>
>> >> >
>> >> > Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> >> > >
>> >> > > On 26 Jul 2009, at 16:52, David Nyman wrote:
>> >> > >
>> >> > >> Thanks to everyone who responded to my initial sally on dreams and
>> >> > >> machines. Naturally I have arrogated the right to plagiarise your
>> >> > >> helpful comments in what follows, which is an aphoristic synthesis
>> >> > >> of
>> >> > >> my understanding of the main points that have emerged thus far. I
>> >> > >> hope this will be helpful for future discussion.
>> >> > >>
>> >> > >> THE APHORISMS
>> >> > >>
>> >> > >> We do not see the mind, we see *through* the mind.
>> >> > >>
>> >> > >> What we see through the mind - its contents - is mind-stuff:
>> >> > >> dreams.
>> >> > >>
>> >> > >> Hence dream content - i.e. whatever is capable of being present to
>> >> > >> us
>> >> > >> - can't be our ontology - this would be circular (the eye can't
>> >> > >> see
>> >> > >> itself).
>> >> > >>
>> >> > >> So the brain (i.e. what the eye can see) can't be the mind; but
>> >> > >> the
>> >> > >> intuition remains that mind and brain might be correlated by some
>> >> > >> inclusive conception that would constitute our ontology: Kant's
>> >> > >> great
>> >> > >> insight stands.
>> >> >
>> >> > It's more than an intuition. There's lots of evidence the mind and
>> >> > brain are
>> >> > correlated: from getting drunk, concusions, neurosurgery, mrfi,...
>> >> >
>> >> > >>
>> >> > >> It is similarly obvious that 'identity' theories and the like are
>> >> > >> non-sense: it would indeed be hard to think of two descriptions
>> >> > >> less
>> >> > >> 'identical' than brain-descriptions and mind-descriptions: hence
>> >> > >> again, any such identification could only be via some singular
>> >> > >> correlative synthesis.
>> >> > >>
>> >> > >> Hence any claim that the mind is literally identical with, or
>> >> > >> 'inside', the brain can be shown to be false by the simple - if
>> >> > >> messy
>> >> > >> - expedient of a scalpel; or else can be unmasked as implicitly
>> >> > >> dualistic: i.e. the claim is really that 'inside' and 'outside'
>> >> > >> are
>> >> > >> not merely different descriptions, but different ontologies.
>> >> >
>> >> > That's a bit of a straw man you're refuting. I've never heard anyone
>> >> > claim that
>> >> > the mind is the brain. The materialist claim is that the mind is
>> >> > what
>> >> > the
>> >> > brain does, i.e. the mind is a process. That's implicit in COMP, the
>> >> > idea that
>> >> > functionally identical units can substituted for parts of your brain
>> >> > without any
>> >> > untoward effects.
>> >> >
>> >> > Brent
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > >
>> >> >>
>> >
>> >>
>
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Received on Thu Jul 30 2009 - 18:13:08 PDT