2009/7/28 Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>:
> Now, the question "why this 1-OM and not that other one", is like the
> questions:
> - "why do I feel myself in W, and not in M" which is very natural for the
> one going out at W.
> - "why do I feel myself in M, and not in W" which is very natural for the
> one going out at M.
> OK?
Yes, OK, the seven steps: but this isn't the problem. Hmm...let's
see. OK, let's try a different tack. As you have observed, we may
well share some basic intuitions, but we don't share the same goal
here. Yours intentions vis-a-vis COMP are professional, precisely
limited, modest, practical, and as such I endorse them wholeheartedly.
Mine are dilettantish, more personally oriented, probably less
useful; essentially a way of exercising my curiosity. So before going
on, I need to state something obvious, or perhaps not-so-obvious,
related to my personal thinking style.
In internalising your ideas, I try to do so, as it were, by BECOMING
whatever system you are proposing. You might say that this is
reification, but for me it's an indispensable imaginative tool: you
might call it cogification. It's a sort of meditation, and when I was
active as a programmer, I used to be able to do it in my dreams, and
would often actually experience myself as the program going into some
error state - a useful debugging tool! And of course one of the
helpful aspects of cogifying in this way is that you see immediately
what you're getting, what you're NOT getting, and particularly that
you can't get something for nothing.
So all my questions to you really stem from these imaginative
cogifications. I need to know what it FEELS like to be in
Bruno-world. Only then can I find out if it matches my own
experience, and hence the non-negotiable appearances I'm committed to
saving. Thus in the present case, I first scrupulously clearing away
extraneous notions, and commence to cogify myself to your
specifications in order to experience the consequences. As a simple
result of my going about the matter in this way I am totally present
and personally instantiated in my cogifications. My natural
perspective here is that of the One - the global "I": hence all my
questions stem from this perspective.
Now, it impinges on me that I really should justify how the One could
be said to 'focus' itself on - or resolve - a COMP perspective in the
first place: i.e. we must check that what I airily called 'clearing
away extraneous notions' isn't just getting something for nothing.
Actually, 'something *from* nothing' may turn out to be more apt here:
mathematical totality - in effect
everything-inter-related-in-every-possible-way - would be
indistinguishable, from the perspective of the One, from 'nothing'.
This has been pointed out in various ways before. So the first
cogification is (in David Bohm's term) the 'relevation' (relative
elevation) of the number realm and its basic operators: the emergence
of something from nothing. A point of view, or the possibility of
many, emerges. In effect, everything else falls away into background
noise.
Further cogifications are then further levels of relevation: that of
the UD and its infinitely iterated interlaced infinities of steps
distinguished from the background noise of the set of all possible
programs. As I cogify myself in the guise of the UD I'm able to
consider the relevation of further subsets of the global point of
view. Now "I" - as the One - can see interference effects relevate
invariances from the background noise of recursive infinities;
increasingly intricate patterns built on these invariances;
pattern-pattern 'least difference' relations that both create and
differentiate historical sequences; 'events in time' that relevate as
these sequences phase-shift through my global 'observer moment'; white
rabbits that flit by, but get lost against the vast illumination of
reiterated regularity. In this broad-brushed but experientially
persuasive way I'm able to intuit how "I" - as the One - might both
lose and find myself in an infinity of distinguishable personal
regularities against a background of noisy irrelevance.
So my question to you was really about the machinery of perspective,
in the sense I've described above. We often speak of the
indeterminacy of the "I", but I'm at least equally struck by its
determinacy. It's always the same "I", and this is consequent on the
global presence of the One in the light of the options available for
relevating a point of view. As a direct consequence of cogifying
myself in the form of the One, I perceive that I really have two
options only, experientially speaking. I can just sit here
atemporally; present, differentiated and inter-related in all possible
ways, but essentially getting 'nothing' out of it. Or I can relevate
a global observer moment and thus experience a polymorphous parade of
events phase-shifting through it as inter-laced personal histories in
space and time. It may be all illusory, but at least they're MY
illusions: the mini-illusions of the vast cavalcade of mini-mes.
Which option is likely to be the more entertaining way of spending
eternity?
David
> Well, it has, or comp is false. But I suspect you confuse two different
> questions (if I may say so to be short).
> - the ability of the soul to remain conscious when getting to the
> "universal-whole" in the 'conscious way'. This needs work, and typical "let
> it go" abilities, detachement, abnegation, amnesia (and is another topic).
> And then the consciousness of your most probable relative situation, which
> eventually is determined by a measure on the infinity of computations going
> (arithmetically) through your state.
> And here the mystery is that the apparent physical worlds seem computable.
> How could a sum on an infinity of computations be computable? (it is the
> white rabbit problem).
OK, I said it was wacky, so it's probably wrong (or not even that).
But, as a last try, let me rephrase it thus: you've gone over the
tutorial (which I've always accepted in its essentials) of who "I" am
- so who
David
>
> On 28 Jul 2009, at 13:38, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
> Actually, I do follow the first six steps of the UD reasoning; my own
> 'beam me up, Scotty' reasoning had led me to similar conclusions. So,
> no problem with this. But I do have trouble grasping what is, I
> think, a different aspect of the observer moment, and I'll try to
> state it as clearly as I can. When I imagine an infinity of OMs, as
> it were, co-existing in some atemporal sense, I find I still can't
> satisfactorily answer the question: why am "I" experiencing JUST this
> one?
>
> The UD generates, infinitely often, all 3-OMs, all as (universal) machine
> states, and this through an infinity of computations.
> But the 1-OMs belong to infinities of those "equivalent (by respect of the
> substitution level) 3-OM. They are not aware, cf UDA step 2, of the fact
> that in universal dovetailing time (defined by the (mathematical) execution
> of the UD), some of those 3-OMs will take a *very* long time to be
> generated.
> Now, the question "why this 1-OM and not that other one", is like the
> questions:
> - "why do I feel myself in W, and not in M" which is very natural for the
> one going out at W.
> - "why do I feel myself in M, and not in W" which is very natural for the
> one going out at M.
> OK?
>
> I don't mean of course, why does this experience possess just
> *these* characteristics - this is always determined by the structure
> of the OM, as per the UD steps. The issue, rather, is that "I" is
> essentially a global referent that fundamentally applies only to the
> whole,
>
> Hmm....
>
> and that the 'part' or 'little me' is thus nothing but the
> *viewpoint* of the whole at a given moment
>
> This can be said for the different reason that you are universal yourself
> (in Post Turing Church sense).
> Here, all what happens is that the 1-OM of that universal machine (fallen in
> entangled multi-computational histories) has all its immediate expectation
> based on a set dense in the whole (like fractions are dense in the real
> numbers). It is not the whole, but it is the infinitely many possible
> computational histories leading to that 1-OM and to those corresponding
> 3-OMs.
>
>
>
>
> So under this assumption the real question is: why is the *whole* at
> this moment seemingly limited to ONLY this view rather than any - or
> indeed all - of the available co-existing alternatives?
>
> For the reason that when your body is duplicated, your soul is not.
> You wake up at M, and only can bet "intellectually" on your doppelganger in
> W.
> It is the same reason why Everett quantum observer cannot feel the split.
> Amoebas divides, 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, each can ask why me, and why here and
> now.
> But, as Plotinus and others have seen, "we" can somehow experience some
> inverse path ... 8, 4, 2, 01 and going back to the universal. (But this is
> not needed for the derivability of physics).
> Here is a nice "inverse path", btw:
> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-lFT4H7E7Ac&feature=channel_page
> Push pause at the beginning, you will see a yellow things with 16 little
> appendices. With good eyes you can guess the 32 more little appendices, and
> you can see behind the 64 and the balck 128. So you have at the start
> M... 128 64 32 16.
> Then start the video to see the sequel ... 8, 4, 2, 1, M. (followed by ...
> M, and zooming in back). Exercise :)
>
> And in the
> light of an infinity of co-existing OMs, I can't answer this, because
> such a co-existing whole should presumably co-presently see (i.e.
> 'be') ALL points of view 'at once'. AFAICS, notions of measure do not
> suffice to resolve this.
>
> Well, it has, or comp is false. But I suspect you confuse two different
> questions (if I may say so to be short).
> - the ability of the soul to remain conscious when getting to the
> "universal-whole" in the 'conscious way'. This needs work, and typical "let
> it go" abilities, detachement, abnegation, amnesia (and is another topic).
> And then the consciousness of your most probable relative situation, which
> eventually is determined by a measure on the infinity of computations going
> (arithmetically) through your state.
> And here the mystery is that the apparent physical worlds seem computable.
> How could a sum on an infinity of computations be computable? (it is the
> white rabbit problem).
>
>
>
> However I have a wacky intuition: despite the platonic criterion of
> co-existence, 1-person experience of the temporal dynamism (i.e.
> sequentiality) of the part - i.e. each OM - might reasonably persuade
> us that sequentiality should also possess, in some ineliminable sense,
> a role in the whole. Consequently, under this assumption, could the
> UD (to reify it only to this degree)
>
> The UD exists, like the number 17 exists. No less, no more.
> (of course the UD is "really" universal if and only if Post-Church-Turing
> thesis is true).
>
>
> be conceived for this purpose to
> be 'sequentially resolving' each 'OM-programme-step'? Indeed my
> understanding is that this dovetailed sequentiality is actually a key
> conceptual element of COMP.
>
> Not sure to see what you mean. It is a key to be sure to go through all
> 3-OMs, with the correct (recursively invariant) redundancy (without which
> there would indeed be no measure possible).
>
>
> In this sense - and in this sense only -
> could the UD therefore be thought of as temporally instantiating that
> OM *uniquely* at each step on behalf of the whole COMP-multiverse, and
> thus bringing into focus - in effect - its *unique* point of view?
>
> Well, if you name the UD states U1, U2, U3, U4, ..., you go sequentially
> through all 3-OMs, and this through the right arithmetical relations
> defining the histories, but your problem reappears at one level above: why
> "am I" in Um and not in Uw. But that problem makes no sense, for the same
> reason that "why I am in M and not in W" makes provably no sense in the
> self-duplication experience.
>
>
>
> Then there is the global first person indeterminacy, which appears at step
>
> 7, although it is "definitely there" with the step 8. It is the
>
> indeterminacy of your immediate subjective future "in front" of a never
>
> ending universal dovetailing. At that step, assuming (or not with step 8) a
>
> concrete universal dovetailing in the universe (or in arithmetic) you should
>
> understand that you are duplicated " at each instant", so that your future
>
> subjective instant is determined by an infinity of computations: all those
>
> (existing in the U dovetailing) going through your actual states. So, in
>
> order to attach your mind to a physical appearance, you have to justify the
>
> physical appearances from an infinite set of computational histories. OK?
>
> Yes, I understand as I've said above that I am duplicated at each
> instant (what I used to think of as being 'teleported into the
> future'). However, I must press you on your use of the expression
> 'going through your actual states'. I think you mean:
>
> 1) Your 'actual state' corresponds to some OM (i.e. the one you 'find'
> yourself in).
>
> Well, my mental "RITSIAR" state corresponds to an infinity of 3-OM
> generated by the DU.
>
> 2) The UD entails that an infinity of prior and posterior states is
> implied by your finding yourself in *this* OM - i.e. they 'go through'
> this state.
>
> OK.
>
>
> 3) Hence the physical appearances you discover in this OM must depend
> on (i.e. be justified by) the totality of these states.
>
> ... in this 1-OM. Yes. But instead of "these states", it is more "the
> totality of the computations leading to theses states". The (in)determinacy
> weight depends on the relative densities of computations.
>
>
> 4) It follows therefore that any association of your mind - as the
> collection of these states - can be correlated only with the
> *totality* of physical appearances derived from this collection.
>
> Is this right?
>
> Not so sure that the phrasing is right.
>
>
>
>
> The physical reality can no more be just a mathematical structure among
>
> others. There may or may not exist such a structure, but in any case this
>
> structure or quasi-structure has to result from the statistical
>
> "interference" of an infinity of computations.
>
> Implied by 3) above.
>
> OK.
>
>
>
> AUDA illustrates the consistency of such an idea, and provides a technical
>
> way to extract already the logic of the observable events. But AUDA is far
>
> more demanding in logico-mathematical technicalities.
>
> You said it!
>
> Hmm...
>
>
> AUDA is UDA, where the "yes doctor" is replaced by a "direct" interview of a
>
> correct self-introspecting universal machine.
>
> Somehow, what I am saying in AUDA is that, thanks to the work of Gödel, Löb,
>
> Solovay, etc., we can already have a talk with the universal machine and ask
>
> her opinion, and what "her" physics looks like.
>
> Now, the 'yes doctor' is an act of faith. But how much further will
> we be able to rely on the machine's opinions on what her physics looks
> like? Enough to take the leap with certainty, or is there always some
> irresolvable doubt? (I think the answer is yes, because the
> substitution level remains always below the level of introspection.)
>
> And there is the doubt about our own correctness, and even consistency.
> The doubt about the presence of a bug.
> The doubt "am I dreaming?"
> The doubt, as you say, that we have chosen the correct substitution level.
> The doubt about the ability of the surgeon,
> the doubt about the reliability of the artificial brain,
> the doubt "should I take a mac of a pc?"
> That are the eternal doubts of the terrestrial numbers ...
>
>
>
>
> Then it is a rather technical point to show that by adding non computational
>
> power to such a universal machine will not change the AUDA interview, unless
>
> you bring necessarily vague ad hoc "non comp" feature build for changing the
>
> interview.
>
> So what is consequential on this? Do you mean that in this case the
> machine can still derive consistent (though incomplete) opinions on
> her physics and therefore make reasonable bets on her duplicability?
>
> Consistent but false. (not even assuming comp, but assuming elementary
> arithmetic).
> Perhaps inconsistent.
>
>
>
> If a universal machine bet that God create earth and heaven in
>
> six days and that she is not duplicable, well, it becomes hard to even argue
>
> if the AUDA physics will change or not.
>
> And what is consequential on this? Do you mean that her view of her
> physics has become such that neither she (by fiat) nor we (per theory)
> can make reasonable bets on her duplicability?
>
> We are leaving the topic here. ... of course there is the correct theory of
> the insane machine. But there is also the insane theory of the insane
> machine, and a correct theory can exist about that! I let the subject to
> machine psychoanalysts.
> But all machine are duplicable, I would say by definition.
> .
>
>
>
>
> Hope this "heroic failure" can help the grandma a little bit,
>
> Yes, it helps when we go more slowly and step by step, so that the
> ignoramus can keep up.
>
> Step by step is my favorite pedagogy, inherited from mathematics. Some
> mathematicians, like in category theory, will say that global pictures and
> diagrams are best, and I agree with that. Step by step, but on mail, it is
> hard to make quickly little drawings. Sigh.
> Bruno
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
> >
>
--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list.domain.name.hidden
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe.domain.name.hidden
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
Received on Wed Jul 29 2009 - 15:09:49 PDT