2009/7/27 Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>:
> Actually, the real axiom is a self-duplicability principle. According
> to the duplicability, you will have the whole of AUDA remaining
> correct and even complete, at the propositional level, for many
> "gods" (non emulable entities). The theology of the machine van be
> lifted to almost all "self-duplicable" entities (but the proofs get
> more complex). It applies to most of the "gods" I mentioned in some
> post. You have to go very near the big unnameable for getting rid of
> the completeness of G/G* propositional theology. This was seen by
> Solovay (with other terms).
> Or you have to postulate we are much less than universal machine,
> which is just "obviously false", imo.
> This is a weakness, it means we can only test a very general
> principle. Most gods have similar physical realities, they have the
> same observable. Physics become a very strong invariant, it is stable
> for many non recursive permutations. But it is real hard math to
> handle all this material.
> Actually, comp itself has a huge spectrum according to the choice of
> substitution level. Transfinite weakenings of the notion of
> substitution level can help to extend most comp consequence on those
> weakenings. But this could be only of academical interest, I don't know.
> I am not sure I would say "yes" to a doctor who does propose me an
> actual infinite brains.
Actually, I find much of the above VERY hard to follow except in a
vague way. Would it be possible, as an accompaniment of your
step-by-step exposition of the UD in detail, to also give a
step-by-step storyline of the above, but with the absolutely
irreducible minimum of reliance on the deeper (i.e. very hard for
ingnorami like me to access) technicalities. You could say, for
example, at any point "to go further you would need a deeper grasp of
x, but for now, it has this or that role or function in the overall
story" - or something like that. I'd be very grateful - and
attentive.
We talked in the past of a grandmother version or roadmap - do you
recall? I've got a feeling that you sometimes wonder if you may let
us - or yourself - down by *not* going into all the detail all the
time, but the problem - at least for me - is that my memory isn't
retentive enough to retain the pivotal elements of the narrative
whilst we charge off on the next - no doubt essential - safari into
the logical-mathematical jungle. But could we try grandma's version
again? Even heroic failure would teach us something.
David
>
>
> On 27 Jul 2009, at 16:25, David Nyman wrote:
>
>>
>> On 27 July, 09:46, Bruno Marchal <marc....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>>
>>> ... yet, the shadows of braids and links(*) appear somehow in the two
>>> matter hypostases, and this in a context where space (not juts time)
>>> has to be a self-referential context, in that weak sense, such work
>>> seems to go in the right direction. Of course the approach are
>>> different, and loop gravity suffers the usual weakness of the whole
>>> aristotelian theology, where the observer's experiences are
>>> abstracted
>>> away. All this relies to AUDA.
>>
>> Essentially you're saying that any truly successful mind-body (not
>> just 'body') TOE *must* be a generative account of the emergence of
>> observers and their specific relations to their observed
>> environments. Of course this is explicitly 'non-objective', which is
>> probably equivalent to heresy if not blasphemy for physicists.
>
> Well the 'non-objective part' is treated "objectively" with a usual
> third person sharable theory, and indeed already shared, given that
> the TOE is number theory.
>
> What could be heresy for some physicalist is that physics is no more a
> fundamental science and physical reality emerge from a first person
> plural self-reference, but not based on us, but on all universal
> numbers (so it is neither a solipsism nor an anthropomorphism).
>
> What is the fundamental science? I would call that the theology of
> numbers.
>
>
>>
>>
>> What is presented in the NS piece is - as always - a structural
>> description of a generalised environment that presumably relies
>> without further justification on some assumed 'identity' with 'parts'
>> of it to account for observers and their experiences: e.g. "we could
>> be nothing more than a bundle of stubborn dreadlocks in space".
>
>
> ?
>
> I think we are persons, universal persons.
> You could say, with a bit of salt, that person is a number which
> moves itself, relatively to many numbers.
>
>
>
>> As
>> you say, the observer is in effect abstracted out of such accounts.
>> But let's say, for argument's sake, that my mind *isn't* a digital
>> machine (i.e. can't be replaced by a digital computer). Nonetheless, I
>> still need to give an explicit account of observers and their
>> experiences in some other - presumably non-digital-computational -
>> way.
>
> Yes.
>
>
>
>
>> This might rely on, say, a fundamentally topological/analogical
>> analysis in terms of some primary continuum, that could nevertheless
>> incorporate generative and recursive features analogous to those of
>> COMP (but as you see I'm way out of my depth here).
>>
>> So my question is: do you think that there could be a non-COMP account
>> of such a kind *in principle*?
>
> Yes. It is even a consequence of COMP. COMP implies the possibility
> that COMP could be false. It justifies the "act of faith" needed for
> saying "yes" to the doctor. It "un-trivializes" the act.
>
>
>
>
>> Or does the UDA analysis intend to
>> show that *only* an account that is fundamentally digital/
>> computational can explain the emergence of observers and their
>> experiences with *all* the features that must actually be accounted
>> for? And even in the absence of any prior claim that the mind itself
>> is a digital computation?
>
> Actually, the real axiom is a self-duplicability principle. According
> to the duplicability, you will have the whole of AUDA remaining
> correct and even complete, at the propositional level, for many
> "gods" (non emulable entities). The theology of the machine van be
> lifted to almost all "self-duplicable" entities (but the proofs get
> more complex). It applies to most of the "gods" I mentioned in some
> post. You have to go very near the big unnameable for getting rid of
> the completeness of G/G* propositional theology. This was seen by
> Solovay (with other terms).
> Or you have to postulate we are much less than universal machine,
> which is just "obviously false", imo.
> This is a weakness, it means we can only test a very general
> principle. Most gods have similar physical realities, they have the
> same observable. Physics become a very strong invariant, it is stable
> for many non recursive permutations. But it is real hard math to
> handle all this material.
> Actually, comp itself has a huge spectrum according to the choice of
> substitution level. Transfinite weakenings of the notion of
> substitution level can help to extend most comp consequence on those
> weakenings. But this could be only of academical interest, I don't know.
> I am not sure I would say "yes" to a doctor who does propose me an
> actual infinite brains.
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
> >
>
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Received on Tue Jul 28 2009 - 01:56:51 PDT