Hi Kim,
RITSIAR means real in the sense that I am real.
Cheers
Brian
Kim Jones wrote:
> Could somebody kindly tell me/explain to me what "RITSIAR" means? I
> cannot find any explanation of this in the threads which mention it.
>
> Sorry to be dumb,
>
> Kim
>
>
> On 27/07/2009, at 12:52 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>> Thanks to everyone who responded to my initial sally on dreams and
>> machines. Naturally I have arrogated the right to plagiarise your
>> helpful comments in what follows, which is an aphoristic synthesis of
>> my understanding of the main points that have emerged thus far. I
>> hope this will be helpful for future discussion.
>>
>> THE APHORISMS
>>
>> We do not see the mind, we see *through* the mind.
>>
>> What we see through the mind - its contents - is mind-stuff: dreams.
>>
>> Hence dream content - i.e. whatever is capable of being present to us
>> - can't be our ontology - this would be circular (the eye can't see
>> itself).
>>
>> So the brain (i.e. what the eye can see) can't be the mind; but the
>> intuition remains that mind and brain might be correlated by some
>> inclusive conception that would constitute our ontology: Kant's great
>> insight stands.
>>
>> It is similarly obvious that 'identity' theories and the like are
>> non-sense: it would indeed be hard to think of two descriptions less
>> 'identical' than brain-descriptions and mind-descriptions: hence
>> again, any such identification could only be via some singular
>> correlative synthesis.
>>
>> Hence any claim that the mind is literally identical with, or
>> 'inside', the brain can be shown to be false by the simple - if messy
>> - expedient of a scalpel; or else can be unmasked as implicitly
>> dualistic: i.e. the claim is really that 'inside' and 'outside' are
>> not merely different descriptions, but different ontologies.
>>
>> By extension of our individual introspecting, a plurality of minds,
>> and the 'external world' that includes brains, can be conceived as
>> correlated in some way - to be elucidated - in a universal synthesis
>> or context: that context being our mutual ontology.
>>
>> Such a universal context, or in common terms 'what exists', cannot be
>> fully known (i.e. can't be exhausted by description) although - or
>> rather because - it constitutes what we are, and by extension what
>> *everything* is.
>>
>> Nonetheless we may seek a logic of dreaming so far as it goes, and
>> this will indeed be as far as anything goes in the way of knowledge
>> claims.
>>
>> Mathematics may be deployed as a dream-logic: but mathematical
>> physics, restricted to 'physical heuristics', prototypically gets
>> stuck at the level of describing the content and behaviour of dreams,
>> not their genesis.
>>
>> To go further and deeper we need an explicit mathematical
>> specification of dreamers and their dreams, and of generative
>> mechanisms by which dreamers and their dream contents can be
>> constructed.
>>
>> Such a schema will by its nature form an analysis of how we come to
>> believe that we and our world are real, and in what terms: i.e. how we
>> come to know a world in a present and personal manner.
>>
>> Consequently such a schema must subsume within its universe of
>> discourse: being, knowing, perceiving, acting and intending - as the
>> foundations of what it means to be real: i.e. it must be capable of
>> invoking the Cheshire Cat *to the life*, not merely leave its grin
>> hanging in the void.
>>
>> Moving beyond bare analysis and description, any move to universalise
>> and 'realise' the axioms of such a schema is to make a claim on
>> ontological finality. It has not been completely clear (to me)
>> whether COMP necessarily makes such a stipulation on realisation, in
>> the sense of a claim that its axioms *literally are* what is present
>> and personal (i.e. RITSIAR).
>>
>> However I'm coming to suspect that it does not in fact make such a
>> claim, although it allows any one of us to take this as a personal
>> leap of faith, specifically through the acid test of saying yes to the
>> doctor.
>>
>> COMP may turn out to be false in its specific predictions - i.e.
>> empirical tests
>> could rule out the possibility of our being finite machines; or
>> perhaps we can never be sure one way or the other.
>>
>> Nonetheless, the inescapable implication is that any alternative
>> schema must from the outset explicitly and fearlessly address the same
>> problem space or else run foul of the same intractable 0-1-3 person
>> ontological and epistemological issues.
>>
>> This has profound implications for virtually all current cosmological
>> TOEs: i.e. a view from nowhere turns out to be nobody's view. As has
>> been observed in other writings, our understanding remains profoundly
>> obscured and distorted unless we restore the personal to the view from
>> nowhere. Only then can we conceive why indeed there is somewhere
>> rather than nowhere.
>>
>>
>
>
> >
>
>
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Received on Sun Jul 26 2009 - 18:40:19 PDT