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From: Russell Standish <R.Standish.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Thu, 20 Jan 100 10:38:29 +1100 (EST)

*>
*

*> Russell Standish wrote:
*

*>
*

*> >I really am trying to understand your argument. I know I'm from a
*

*> >different conceptual background, but somewhere either you or I have an
*

*> >incorrect concept. I can't accept a statement that A is equivalent to
*

*> >B obviously, when to my understanding A and B are such different things.
*

*>
*

*> I agree. We must work until we understand the roots of our
*

*> misunderstanding.
*

*>
*

*> >i) COMP means that I can survive the replacement of my brain by some
*

*> >Turing emulation.
*

*>
*

*>
*

*> Not really. Look at the UDA. COMP is 3 things:
*

*>
*

*> 1) = what you are saying (survive a substitution done at
*

*> the right digital level, which is supposed to exist)
*

*>
*

*> 2) Church thesis (I realise Schmidhuber does not cite it
*

*> explicitely!, but the use of the compiler theorem and the use of
*

*> his "great programmer" would not work without it).
*

*>
*

*> 3) Arithmetical Realism (here is Schmidhuber plenitude!!!).
*

*> Arithmetical Realism makes all steps of the UD work (Great Programmer's
*

*> work) existing independantly of me.
*

*>
*

Aha - this is the source of one of our misunderstandings. You actually

say this on page 1 of your thesis - I had just forgotten. As you say,

Schmidhuber's Plenitude is really the conjunction of assumptions 2&3,

so you explicitly assume Schmidhuber Plenitude in the first place.

*>
*

*> >I could well imagine conscious entities diagonalising the
*

*> >UD* output to generate an experience which is not an explicit
*

*> >computation.
*

*>
*

*> Well. This is false, and even importantly false. You point
*

*> here on my deeper motivation for Church thesis: the set of all
*

*> computable functions, and the set of all computations, i.e. UD*
*

*> is closed for diagonalisation.
*

*> This is exactly why Godel, who takes time to accept Church thesis,
*

*> called that thesis really a miracle.
*

Fair enough - this was only a shot in the dark anyway. I was trying to

relate my intuitive understanding of conscious projection to some

formal mathematical process - diagonalisation is not the way to go.

*>
*

*> >Of course you can can compute the ensemble (UD*) - this follows from
*

*> >Schmidhuber's Plenitude. Also (in a sense) you can compute the
*

*> >wavefunction in Multiverse, which in turn defines a probability
*

*> >distribution. What you can't compute (or so it seems to me) is the
*

*> >outcome of a projection (1st postulate of consciousness). It is this
*

*> >projection that introduces randomness, or indeterminism into the 1st
*

*> >person view of the world.
*

*>
*

*> This is another point where we disagree. And the disagreement is
*

*> deep (but that is what makes our conversation genuine, isn'it?).
*

*> I say that the disagreement is deep because it is independant of
*

*> comp: it bears even on Everett's MWI.
*

*> In fact it seems to me that with your notion of "projection" you
*

*> are introducing a sort of collapse in comp!
*

*> But it is really computationnalism (in a weak sense) which has
*

*> helped Everett to prove QM does not need any collapses.
*

*> In comp, it is the same. The indeterminism is the consequence of
*

*> the way machines describe the statistics of their self-localisations
*

*> and other self-measures after the natural self-multiplication
*

*> and self-delocalisation forced by the UD.
*

*> If I duplicate you, nobody, including GOD or any quasi omniscient
*

*> being can predict what you will *feel* (1-person concept) precisely.
*

*> Like Everett, comp can predict that you will not feel the split.
*

*>
*

*> Bruno
*

*>
*

It is a "sort" of collapse, however I would argue that this "collapse"

is inherent in Everett's MWI anyway. However, before people go

charging at the red flag I'm waving, I should point the very big

difference between this and the Copenhagen wavefunction collapse. With

Copenhagen, the wavefunction collapse is physical, i.e. to use your

excellent terminology - is a 3-phenomenon. In my case, the projection,

is merely the act of an observer resolving a measurement. It is a pure

1-phenomenon - a different observer will see a different projection

(although clearly in their shared histories these observation need to

be consistent). The picture as I see it is identical to the diagram

you have on page 83 of your thesis.

Now you seem to be saying that this projection is computable - ie

Turing machines embedded within the ensemble are able to have first

person experiences like this. This is the part I'm having trouble

with. I seen some attempts to formulate Quantum measurement theory in

terms of induced correlations between the environment and the observer

(or measurement device) - eg Zurek's attempts in the late '80s, but

none that I've been particularly satisfied with.

Cheers

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dr. Russell Standish Director

High Performance Computing Support Unit,

University of NSW Phone 9385 6967

Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965

Australia R.Standish.domain.name.hidden

Room 2075, Red Centre http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Received on Wed Jan 19 2000 - 15:38:22 PST

Date: Thu, 20 Jan 100 10:38:29 +1100 (EST)

Aha - this is the source of one of our misunderstandings. You actually

say this on page 1 of your thesis - I had just forgotten. As you say,

Schmidhuber's Plenitude is really the conjunction of assumptions 2&3,

so you explicitly assume Schmidhuber Plenitude in the first place.

Fair enough - this was only a shot in the dark anyway. I was trying to

relate my intuitive understanding of conscious projection to some

formal mathematical process - diagonalisation is not the way to go.

It is a "sort" of collapse, however I would argue that this "collapse"

is inherent in Everett's MWI anyway. However, before people go

charging at the red flag I'm waving, I should point the very big

difference between this and the Copenhagen wavefunction collapse. With

Copenhagen, the wavefunction collapse is physical, i.e. to use your

excellent terminology - is a 3-phenomenon. In my case, the projection,

is merely the act of an observer resolving a measurement. It is a pure

1-phenomenon - a different observer will see a different projection

(although clearly in their shared histories these observation need to

be consistent). The picture as I see it is identical to the diagram

you have on page 83 of your thesis.

Now you seem to be saying that this projection is computable - ie

Turing machines embedded within the ensemble are able to have first

person experiences like this. This is the part I'm having trouble

with. I seen some attempts to formulate Quantum measurement theory in

terms of induced correlations between the environment and the observer

(or measurement device) - eg Zurek's attempts in the late '80s, but

none that I've been particularly satisfied with.

Cheers

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dr. Russell Standish Director

High Performance Computing Support Unit,

University of NSW Phone 9385 6967

Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965

Australia R.Standish.domain.name.hidden

Room 2075, Red Centre http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Received on Wed Jan 19 2000 - 15:38:22 PST

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