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From: <GSLevy.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2000 16:27:49 EST

In a message dated 01/18/2000 1:09:02 PM Pacific Standard Time,

jqm1584.domain.name.hidden writes:

*> On Tue, 18 Jan 2000 GSLevy.domain.name.hidden wrote:
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*> > jqm1584.domain.name.hidden writes:
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*> > > The RSSA is not another way of viewing the world; it is a
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*> > > category error.
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*> >
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*> > I use the RSSA as the basis for calculating what I call the relative
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*> > probability, in this group the first person probability, or,
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equivalently,

*>
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*> > the probability conditional on the life of the observer. The ASSA is by
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*> > extension, the assumption for calculating the 3rd person probability.
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*> >
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*> > Let us perform a thought experiment.
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*> > Imagine that you are the scientist in the Schroedinger cat experiment.
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*>
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*> Scratch that. Right now let's stick to the example with Bruno and
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*> the 3 cities, because it's better for the current point.
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*> Suppose Bruno, in 1999, wants to know if he is more likely to be
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*> in Washington or in Moscow during 2001.
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*> First of all, that is not a well defined question, because
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*> "Bruno" must be defined. Suppose we define it to mean the set of all
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*> Bruno-like observations, where by "Bruno-like" we can assume we know what
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*> qualifies.
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*> But then the question becomes meaningless, because it is 100%
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*> certain that he will be in *both* cities. A 3rd person would have to
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*> agree with that, he is in *both* cities.
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*> So let's ask a meaningful question. Among the set of Bruno-like
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*> observations in 2001, what is the effective probability of such an
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*> observation being in Moscow?
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*> This is just a conditional effective probability so we use the
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*> same rule we always use:
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*> p(Moscow|Bruno in 2001) =
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*> M(Moscow, Bru. 2001) / [M(Moscow, Bru. 2001) + M(Washington, Bru. 2001)]
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*> where M is the measure.
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*> So in this case the conditional effective probability of him
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*> seeing Moscow at that time is 10%, and in *1999* he knows he should brush
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*> up on his English because his future 'selves' will be affected by that.
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*>
*

Fine, you have computed the third person probability. Unfortunately, your

example does not have the option of having an independent observer, and

therefore does not illustrate the concept I am trying to communicate.

Please follow and answer my thought experiment the way I posed it, that is

with an observer who is not threatened with death and a subject who is. It is

the only way to bring out the concept of relative probability or 1st and 3rd

person probability.

George Levy

Received on Tue Jan 18 2000 - 13:30:07 PST

Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2000 16:27:49 EST

In a message dated 01/18/2000 1:09:02 PM Pacific Standard Time,

jqm1584.domain.name.hidden writes:

equivalently,

Fine, you have computed the third person probability. Unfortunately, your

example does not have the option of having an independent observer, and

therefore does not illustrate the concept I am trying to communicate.

Please follow and answer my thought experiment the way I posed it, that is

with an observer who is not threatened with death and a subject who is. It is

the only way to bring out the concept of relative probability or 1st and 3rd

person probability.

George Levy

Received on Tue Jan 18 2000 - 13:30:07 PST

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