I read in this exchange:
"I have a problem with infinite time" (or something of such meaning).
Since IMO time is an auxiliary coordinate to 'order the view from the inside
of this (our) universe and in view of the partial knowledge we so far
obtained about it, it is (our?) choice HOW we construct our concept of that
'time'.
<<Reminds me of my son, who - at 05 - did not dare to fall asleep because of
'sorcerers' he learned about in the Kindergarten and was afraid that in
"dreamland" they come up. So I said: "you little stupid kid, why don't you
choose a dreamland in which there are NO sorcerers?" He looked at me "OK"
and sweetly went to sleep. >>
We can change our ID of time into a format in which there is no problem with
its infinity. (Maybe not so easy, but who said 'everything' is easy?) In my
'narrative' about the world I have problems how to handle the timeless
(a-temporal) world and its concepts. I cannot 'change' the "no-time" into
another one.
<G>
John M
(PS: also waiting for a 'readable' new version of UDA). JM
On Sat, May 16, 2009 at 7:44 AM, Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>
> Hi Ronald,
>
>
> On 15 May 2009, at 14:25, ronaldheld wrote:
>
> >
> > Bruno:
> > I will wait for your most recent UDA to be posted here.
>
> All right.
>
>
>
> >
> > I have problems with infinite time and resources for your
> > computations, if done in this physical Universe.
>
> Sure. Note that I use unbounded physical resources only in the step
> seven, to make the argument smoother, but the step 08 eliminates the
> need of that assumption. All you have to believe in is that a
> mathematical Turing machine either stop or not stop.
>
>
> Best,
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> >
> >
> >
> > On May 14, 12:22 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> >> Ronald,
> >>
> >> On 14 May 2009, at 13:19, Ronald (ronaldheld) wrote:
> >>
> >>> Can you explain your Physics statement in more detail, which I can
> >>> understand?
> >>
> >> UDA *is* the detailed explanation of that "physics statement". So it
> >> would be simpler if you could tell me at which step you have a
> >> problem
> >> of understanding, or an objection, or something. You can search UDA
> >> in
> >> the archives for older or more recent versions, or read my SANE2004
> >> paper:
> >>
> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/
> >> SANE2004MARCHALAbstract...
> >>
> >> In a nutshell, the idea is the following. If we are machine we are
> >> duplicable. If we distinguish the first person by their personal
> >> memories, sufficiently introspective machine can deduce that they
> >> cannot predict with certainty they personal future in either self-
> >> duplicating experience, or in "many-identical-states preparation"
> >> like
> >> a concrete universal dovetailer would do "all the time".
> >> So, if you are concretely in front of a concrete universal
> >> dovetailer,
> >> with the guaranty it will never stop (in some steady universe à-la
> >> Hoyle for example), you are in a high state of first person
> >> indeterminacy, given that the universal dovetailer will execute all
> >> the computations going through your actual state. Sometimes I have to
> >> remind the step 5 for helping the understanding here. In that state,
> >> from a first person perspective you don't know in which computational
> >> history you belong, but you can believe (as far as you are willing to
> >> believe in comp) that there are infinitely many of them. If you agree
> >> to identify an history by its infinite steps, or if you accept the
> >> Y =
> >> II principle (that if a story bifurcate," Y ", you multiply their
> >> similar comp-past, so Y gives II), then you can understand that the
> >> cardinal (number) of your histories going through you actual state is
> >> 2^aleph_zero. It is a continuum. Of course you can first person
> >> distinguish only a enumerable quotient of it, and even just a finite
> >> part of that enumeration. "Stable consciousness" need deep stories
> >> (very long yet redundant stories, it is deep in Bennett sense) and a
> >> notion of linear multiplication of independent stories.
> >> Now the laws of arithmetic provides exactly this, and so you can,
> >> with
> >> OCCAM just jump to AUDA, but you have to study one or two book of
> >> mathematical logic and computer science before. (the best are Epstein
> >> & Carnielli, or Boolos, Burgess and Jeffrey).
> >> Or, much easier, but not so easy, meditate on the eighth step of UDA,
> >> which shows that form their first point of view universal machine
> >> cannot distinguish "real" from "virtual", but they cannot distinguish
> >> "real" from "arithmetical" either, so that the arithmetical realm
> >> defines the intrinsic first person indeterminacy of any universal
> >> machine. Actually the eighth step shows that comp falsifies the usual
> >> mind/physical-machine identity thesis, but it does not falsify a
> >> weaker mind/many-mathematical machines thesis.
> >>
> >> If interested I suggest you study UDA in Sane2004, and ask any
> >> questions, or find a flaw etc.
> >> (or wait for a more recent version I have yet to put on my page)
> >>
> >> Thanks for the reference to Kent's paper (it illustrates very well
> >> the
> >> knotty problems you get into when you keep Everett, materialism and
> >> the identity thesis, but I have read it only diagonally just now).
> >>
> >> Hope this helped a bit.
> >>
> >> Bruno
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>> On May 13, 11:30 am, Bruno Marchal <marc....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> >>>> Thanks Russell, I will take a look. At first sight he makes the
> >>>> same
> >>>> "error" with numbers that Wolfram makes with cellular automata.
> >>>> Those
> >>>> are still mathematical form of physicalism, incompatible with the
> >>>> mechanist thesis in the cognitive science. Of course we converge
> >>>> toward rather similar (recursively isomorphic or weakened)
> >>>> ontologies.
> >>>> But they seems to believe they can recover some physics from that,
> >>>> where, saying "yes" to the surgeon requires to abandon that very
> >>>> idea.
> >>>> Physics, like in Plato and Plotinus, is not a mathematical
> >>>> structure
> >>>> among others, it is a mathematical structure which relate all
> >>>> mathematical structures in a precise way. Physics is somehow much
> >>>> more
> >>>> fundamental than being a thing completely describable by a set of
> >>>> mechanical laws.
> >>>> Pu in another way, such theories are unaware of the mind-body
> >>>> problem
> >>>> and still use an identity relation between a mind and a
> >>>> implementation
> >>>> of a program which UDA forces to abandon, to be frank.
> >>>> This does not mean those works are uninteresting of course, and
> >>>> they
> >>>> may play some role in the unravelling of the Minds and Bodies
> >>>> problems. Sure.
> >>
> >>>> Bruno
> >>
> >>>> On 13 May 2009, at 01:15, russell standish wrote:
> >>
> >>>>> Hi Bruno,
> >>
> >>>>> Have you come across Victor Korotkikh's stuff? He's got a recent
> >>>>> article out in Complexity:
> >>
> >>>>>
> http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/121426751/abstract?CRETRY=
> >>>>> ...
> >>
> >>>>> (Complexity, 14, 40-46)
> >>
> >>>>> It basically explores the organisational properties of the
> >>>>> integers,
> >>>>> prime numbers etc. Which is kind of interesting in a pure
> >>>>> mathematical
> >>>>> way, but he then uses this to model real complex systems, emergent
> >>>>> properties and so on. If you can't get the above paper, here is a
> >>>>> much
> >>>>> earlier one that is not behind a paywall:
> >>>>> http://www.complexity.org.au/ci/vol03/victor2/
> >>
> >>>>> I've met him a few times over the years - he's based in
> >>>>> Townsville,
> >>>>> about 2000km north of here. He's an intense Russian who's
> >>>>> presentation
> >>>>> is almost impenetrable - but there are people I respect who
> >>>>> consider
> >>>>> him a genius.
> >>
> >>>>> It struck me this morning how similar in many ways his programme
> >>>>> is to
> >>>>> yours. I suppose you both share a strong neo-platonic viewpoint
> >>>>> for
> >>>>> starters.
> >>
> >>>>> Cheers
> >>
> >>>>> --
> >>
> >>>>>
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
> -
> >>>>> Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> >>>>> Mathematics
> >>>>> UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco....domain.name.hidden
> >>>>> Australia http://
> >>>>> www.hpcoders.com.au
> >>>>>
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
> -
> >>
> >>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/-Hide quoted text -
> >>
> >>>> - Show quoted text -
> >>
> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/- Hide quoted text -
> >>
> >> - Show quoted text -
> > >
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
> >
>
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Received on Sun May 17 2009 - 16:15:05 PDT