Re: No MWI

From: ronaldheld <RonaldHeld.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Fri, 15 May 2009 05:27:50 -0700 (PDT)

I still do not see any arguments against what I read, that one
Universe fits observations better than the MWI.
                                                            Ronald

On May 15, 1:01 am, daddycay....domain.name.hidden wrote:
> On May 14, 9:47 pm, daddycay....domain.name.hidden wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On May 14, 4:45 pm, Colin Hales <c.ha....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>
> > > At the same time  position 01 completely fails to explain an
> > > observer of the kind able to do 1a.
>
> > I would say that position 02 fails to explain the observer too, you
> > have to actually explain the observer to claim that a position
> > explains the observer.  But position 2 at least provides the topology
> > to allow doubt, so that there is room for an observer to be explained
> > in the future.
>
> > > ...
> > > Yet position 1 behaviour stops you from finding position 2 ...
> > > and problems unsolved because they are only solvable by position 2
> > > remain unsolved merely because of 1b religiosity.
>
> > If what you mean by religiosity is the disallowance of doubt, then yes
> > by definition position 1 has religiosity and position 2 does not.  I
> > agree that disallowance of doubt is not a good thing to have.  I think
> > you said that physicists would also agree, but that they don't
> > practice that way.  I think it's just a matter of frame of mind.  In
> > math we do that a lot, where we suppose that something is true and see
> > where it leads.  I guess in physics the supposing just lasts longer.
> > And the supposing in physics is in the form of math.  What other form
> > could supposing in physics possibly take?  It seems that anything you
> > suppose true you can put in the form of a mathematics statement.  I
> > think it all boils down to the fact that we have to keep remembering
> > that we were just supposing, and be able to step back out of it and
> > suppose something else.  I think that's where having lots of people it
> > an advantage, some people are the really dedicated logical inference
> > one step at a time see where the supposition leads, do many
> > experiments, etc.  Other people are the broad brush outside of the box
> > thinkers that think up lots of different possibilites.
>
> > > Hmmm. Just in case there's a misunderstanding of position 2, here's
> > > their contrast rather more pointedly:
>
> > > Position 1
> > > 1a There's a mathematics which describes how the natural world behaves
> > > when we look.
> > > 1b Reality is literally made of the mathematics 1a. (I act as if this
> > > were the case)
>
> > > Position 2
> > > 1a There's a mathematics which describes how the natural world behaves
> > > when we look.
> > > 1b There's a *separate* mathematics of an underlying reality which
> > > operates to produce an observer who sees the reality behaving as per 1a
> > > maths.
> > > 1c There's the actual underlying reality, which is doubted (not claimed)
> > > to 'be' 1b or 1a.
>
> > I think that your first description of position 2 seemed to
> > necessitate some kind of basic matter that things are made of.  But I
> > think your second description of position 2 (above, by the way, 2a,
> > 2b, 2c typo above) doesn't necessarily require that.  In face your 2c
> > above says that the underlying reality is doubted to be 1b or 1a.  I
> > think that your doubt and underlying reality could all be placed in 2b
> > instead and you could get rid of 2c.  I think that Bruno's G might
> > correspond to 2a and G* might correspond to 2b, and viola, comp!
>
> > Tom>
>
> i.e. in the case where you put the doubt and underlying reality into
> 2b, then G* could correspond to 2b.- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -
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Received on Fri May 15 2009 - 05:27:50 PDT

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