Hi Stephen,
On 13 May 2009, at 22:20, Stephen Paul King wrote:
> Hi Bruno,
>
> I see the goal that you have, as best I can understand your
> writtings and discussions. I salute your valiant efforts. The ideas
> that I have expressed so far, such as those in this exchange, are
> merely the misgivings and thoughts that I have based on my long
> study of philosophy, I can claim no certification nor degree. I am
> merely an amateur.
You are welcome.
> I still do not understand how it is conscivable to obtain a
> property that is not implicit as a primitive from an assumption that
> is its contrary. I can not obtain free energy from any machine and I
> can not obtain change from any static structure. While it is true
> that one can agrue that the property of "saltiness" can not be found
> in the properties of "Clorine" nor "Sodium", this does not
> invalidate the question of origin because we can show that there is
> a similarity of kind and mere difference in degree between
> saltiness and chemical make up. Change and Staticness are
> categorically different in kind.
You are right, you cannot obtain change from staticness. I don't think
I am pretending that.
>
>
> This proplem is not unique to many monists attempts. The
> eliminatists, such as D.C. Dennett and other to refuse the existense
> of consciousness as a mere epiphenomena or "illusion" tells us
> nothing about the unavoidability, modulo Salvia for example, of
> qualia.
Eliminativism is dangerous. It is insulting. It is like saying "you
are a zombie". Even Thorgny recognize that this is not too kind to
tell to others.
>
> By relagating the notion of implementation, to Robinson
> Arithmatic, etc., one only moves the problem further away from the
> focus of how even the appearence of change, dynamics, etc. obtain.
> The basic idea that you propose, while wonderfully sophisticated and
> nuanced, is in essense no different from that of Bishop Berkeley or
> Plato; it simply does not answer the basic question:
>
> Where does the appearence of change obtain from
> primitives that by definition do not allow for its existence?
Because you can define in arithmetic, using only addition and
multiplication symbols, and logic, the notion of computation, or of
pieces of computation, like you can define provability (by PA, by ZF,
or by any effective theory) already in the very weak (yet Turing
universal) Robinson Arithmetic.
You can entirely define in arithmetic statements of the kind "The
machine x on input y has not yet stop after z steps". The notion of
"time" used here through the notion of computational steps can be
deined entirely from the notion of natural numbers successor (which
can be taken as primitive or defined through addition and
multiplication).
If you prefer, I could tell you that in arithmetic we have a very
notion of time: the natural number sequence. Then we can define in
arithmetic the notion of computation, and the notion of next step for
a computation made by such or such machine. And from that, we can
explain how the subjective appearance of physical times and spaces
occur.
UDA explains why we have to proceed that way, and AUDA explains how we
can do, and actually, it has been done concretely. Of course the
extraction of physics is technically demanding. I should test on new
machine the quantum tautologies (and some people are trying recently
to do so, we will see). Up to now quantum mechanics confirms the comp
self-referential statistics.
You should keep in mind that, due to incompleteness, from the point of
view of the machine, although Bp, Bp & p, Bp & Dp, Bp &Dp & p, all
define the same extensional provability notion (G* knows that), they
differ intensionally for the machine, and, for the machine they obeys
quite different logic. The incompleteness nuances forces the
arithmetical reality to *appear* very differently "from inside". The
Theatetical knower Bp & p, for example, gives a knowledge operator,
and can be used to explain why machine can know many things, but also
why they can not define knowledge, why the first person knower has
really no name, etc. The logic of Bp & Dp & p gives a logic of qualia,
or perceptive fields, etc.
Don't hesitate to ask question. Normally UDA is much simpler to
understand than AUDA. I will reexplain the step seven to Kim, soon or
later.
Bruno
Time is an illusion, but the illusion of time is not an illusion.
It is a theorem that all self-referentially correct machines are
confronted with such an illusion, and they make precise discourses
about them. UDA forbids to take such arithmetical machine as mere
zombie, or you have to abandon the comp hypothesis.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Received on Thu May 14 2009 - 16:35:35 PDT