2009/4/29 Quentin Anciaux <allcolor.domain.name.hidden>:
>>> In Bruno's Washington/Moscow thought experiment that information isn't
>>> in your consciousness, although it's available via third persons. My
>>> view of the experiment is that you would lose a bit of consciousness,
>>> that you can't slice consciousness arbitrarily finely in time.
>>
>> Could the question be settled by actual experiment, i.e. asking the
>> subject if they noticed anything unusual?
>>
>>
>> --
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>
> For this you would need an actual AI and also that everybody agreed on
> the fact that this AI is conscious and not a zombie.
>
> If you can settle that, then an interview should be counted as proof.
> But I'm not sure you can prove the AI is conscious, nor with the same
> argument I'm not sure I could prove to you that I am.
Well, you could just ask the teleported human. If he says he feels
fine, didn't notice anything other than the scenery changing, would
that count for anything? I suppose you could argue that of course he
would say that since a gap in consciousness is by definition not
noticeable, but then you end up with a variant of the zombie argument:
he says everything feels OK, but in actual fact he experiences
nothing.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
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Received on Wed Apr 29 2009 - 23:36:20 PDT