Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2009/4/25 Brent Meeker <meekerdb.domain.name.hidden>:
>
>
>> But is it the information in consciousness and is it discrete? If you
>> include the information that is in the brain, but not in consciousness,
>> I can buy the concept of relating states by similarity of content. Or
>> if you suppose a continuum of states that would provide a sequence. It
>> is only when you postulate discrete states containing only the contents
>> of instants of conscious thought, that I find difficulty.
>>
>
> I'm not sure I understand. Are you saying that the information in most
> physical processes, but not consciousness, can be discrete? I would
> have said just the opposite: that even if it turns out that physics is
> continuous and time is real, it would still be possible to chop up
> consciousness into discrete parts (albeit of finite duration) and
> there would still be continuity.
I could buy that if the finite duration was long enough that the content
of the conscious interval was sufficient to order the intervals.
Otherwise you'd need some extrinsic variable to order them (e.g physical
time, brain states).
> In fact, I can't imagine how
> consciousness could possibly be discontinuous if this was done, for
> where would the information that tells you you've been chopped up
> reside?
In Bruno's Washington/Moscow thought experiment that information isn't
in your consciousness, although it's available via third persons. My
view of the experiment is that you would lose a bit of consciousness,
that you can't slice consciousness arbitrarily finely in time.
Brent
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Received on Tue Apr 28 2009 - 14:24:07 PDT