Kelly wrote:
> On Apr 24, 3:14 am, Jason Resch <jasonre....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>
>> Kelly,
>>
>> Your arguments are compelling and logical, you have put a lot of doubt
>> in my mind about computationalism.
>>
>
> Excellent!
>
> It sounds like you are following the same path as I did on all of
> this.
>
> So it makes sense to start with the idea of physicalism and the idea
> that the mind is like a very complex computer, since this explains
> third person observations of human behavior and ability very well I
> think.
>
> BUT, then the question of first person subjective consciousness
> arises. Where does that fit in with physicalism? So the next step is
> to expand to physicalism + full computationalism, where the
> computational activities of the brain also explain consciousness, in
> addition to behavior and ability.
>
It's really cool to see folks exploring where I have been and seeing the
same problems. I might be able to shed a little light on a productive
'next step' for exploration:
Try understanding the difference between a natural world which IS
literally a mathematics, not a natural world described BY a mathematics.
Note that a Turing machine is an instrument of a 'BY' computationalism,
not the natural computation that I am speaking of. If you can get your
head around this, then the answers (to a first person perspective) can
be found. Stop thinking 'computation OF' and start thinking 'natural
computation that IS'. Also very useful is the idea of using the
explanation of a capacity to do science (grounded in a first person
experience that is, in context, literally scientific observation) ...
this is a very testable behaviour and represents the last thing
physicists seem to want to explain: /themselves/. A green field in which
it is obvious that cognition is most definitely not computation in the
'computation BY' sense.
Enjoy!
colin hales
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Received on Sun Apr 26 2009 - 10:29:52 PDT