Kelly wrote:
> On Apr 21, 11:31 am, Bruno Marchal <marc....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>
>> We could say that a state A access to a state B if there is a
>> universal machine (a universal number relation) transforming A into B.
>> This works at the ontological level, or for the third person point of
>> view. But if A is a consciousness related state, then to evaluate the
>> probability of personal access to B, you have to take into account
>> *all* computations going from A to B, and thus you have to take into
>> account the infinitely many universal number relations transforming A
>> into B. Most of them are indiscernible by "you" because they differ
>> below "your" substitution level.
>>
>
> So, going back to some of your other posts about "transmitting" a copy
> of a person from Brussels to Moscow. What is it that is transmitted?
> Information, right? So for that to be a plausible scenario we have to
> say that a person at a particular instant in time can be fully
> described by some set of data.
>
> It would seem to me that their conscious state at that instant must be
> recoverable from that set of data. The only question is, what
> conditions must be met for them to "experience" this state, which is
> completely described by the data set? I don't see any obvious reason
> why anything additional is needed. What does computation really add
> to this?
>
> You say that computation is crucial for this "experience" to take
> place. But why would this be so? Why couldn't we just say that your
> various types of mathematical logic can describe various types of
> correlations, categories, patterns, and relationships between
> informational states, but don't actually contribute anything to
> conscious experience?
>
> Conscious experience is with the information. Not with the
> computations that describe the relations between various informational
> states.
>
>
>> But if A is a consciousness related state, then to evaluate
>> the probability of personal access to B, you have to take
>> into account *all* computations going from A to B
>>
>
> I don't see how probability enters into it. A and B are both fully
> contained conscious states.
Here you are assuming the point in question - whether the states are, by
themselves, conscious. If they are then it would imply that a record,
written on paper or a CD, of the state information transmitted in
Bruno's thought experiment would also be conscious. Even further, if
you identify information as a Platonic form, then it doesn't even need a
physical instantiation. The conscious state will simply exist like the
number two exists.
> Both will be realized, because both
> platonically exist as possible sets of information. State B may have
> a "memory" of State A. State A may have an "expectation" (or
> premonition) of State B. But that is the only link between the two.
> Otherwise the exist independenty.
>
> So Brian Greene had a good passage somewhat addressing this in his
> last book. He's actually talking about the block universe idea, but
> still applicable I think:
>
> "In this way of thinking, events, regardless of when they happen from
> any particular perspective, just are. They all exist. They eternally
> occupy their particular point in spacetime. This is no flow.
But Greene is assuming a real-line topology, so a sequence of
consciousness is connected.
> If you
> were having a great time at the stroke of midnight on New Year's Eve,
> 1999, you still are, since that is just one immutable location in
> spacetime.
>
> The flowing sensation from one moment to the next arises from our
> conscious recognition of change in our thoughts, feelings, and
> perceptions. Each moment in spacetime - each time slice - is like one
> of the still frames in a film.
Again, that is part of the question. Is the universe digital.
> It exists whether or not some projector
> light illuminates it. To the you who is in any such moment, it is the
> now, it is the moment you experience at that moment. And it always
> will be. Moreover, within each individual slice, your thoughts and
> memories are sufficiently rich to yield a sense that time has
> continuously flowed to that moment.
This is what I find dubious. It is certainly true is a sense if an
individual slice is thick enough, but it seems to me to be false in the
limit of thin slices - and if the slice cannot be arbitrarily thin, a
"point in time", then the question remains as to what is the dimension
along which it is thick.
Brent
> This feeling, this sensation that
> time is flowing, doesn't require previous moments - previous frames -
> to be sequentially illuminated."
>
> On your earlier post:
>
>
>> The physical has to emerge from the statistical
>> probability interference among all computations, going through my
>> (current) states that are indiscernible from my point of view.
>> Why such interference takes the form of wave interference is still a
>> (technical) open problem.
>>
>
> In my view, I just happen to be inhabit a perceptual universe that is
> fairly orderly and follows laws of cause and effect. However, there
> are other conscious observers (including other versions of me) who
> inhabit perceptual universes that are much more chaotic and
> nonsensical.
>
> But everything that can be consciously experienced is experienced,
> because there exists information (platonically) that describes a mind
> (human, animal, or other) having that experience.
>
> I say that because it seems to me that this information could
> (theoretically) be produced by a computer simulation of such a mind,
> which would presumably be conscious. So add platonism to that, and
> there you go!
>
>
>
>
> >
>
>
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Received on Wed Apr 22 2009 - 08:49:58 PDT