2009/4/20 Kelly <harmonk00.domain.name.hidden>:
>
> What is the advantage of assigning consciousness to computational
> processes (e.g. UDA), as opposed to just assigning it to the
> information that is produced by computational processes?
>
> For example, to take Maudlin's "Computation and Consciousness" paper,
> if you just say that the consciousness is found in the information
> represented by the arrangement of the empty or full water troughs,
> then that basically removes the problem he is pointing out.
>
> Similarly, associated consciousness only with information seems to
> resolve problems with random processes interfering with the causal
> structure of physically implemented computations which then, despite
> having the causal chain interrupted, would still seem to produce
> consciousness. (more on the irrelevance of causality:
> http://platonicmindscape.blogspot.com/2009/02/irrelevance-of-causality.html)
>
> Bruno Marchal has mentioned this in his movie graph argument, where a
> cosmic ray interrupts a logical operation in a transistor on a
> computer that is running a brain simulation, but due to good fortune
> the result of the operation is still correct despite the break in the
> causal chain that produced the answer.
>
> Conscious being associated with information would also seem to address
> the problems with Davidson's "swampman" scenario, and the related
> quantum swampman scenario (http://platonicmindscape.blogspot.com/
> 2009/03/quantum-swampman.html).
>
> So, many different programs can produce the same information, using
> many different algorithms, optimizations, shortcuts, etc. But if all
> of these programs all accurately simulate the same brain, then they
> should produce the same conscious experience, regardless of the
> various implementation details.
>
> The most obvious thing that all such programs would have in common is
> that they work with the same information...the state of the brain at
> each given time slice. Even if this state is stored in different
> forms by each of the various programs, there must always be a mapping
> between those various storage formats, as well as a mapping back to
> the original brain whose activity is being simulated.
>
> Therefore, it seems better to me to say: Consciousness is
> information, not the processes that produce the information.
>
> What are the drawbacks of this view when contrasted with
> computationalism?
The drawback is that any physical system (which could be mapped onto
any information or any computation) would be conscious. This is only a
drawback if you believe, I guess as a matter of faith, that it is
false.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
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Received on Mon Apr 20 2009 - 22:14:31 PDT