2009/4/3 Brent Meeker <meekerdb.domain.name.hidden>:
> But if you're going to derive physics from consciousness you need to
> explain what connects across the gap - why is it still "you". I
> appreciate that part of the answer is memories, although Bruno seems to
> think they are inessential. But even if they are part of the answer
> there still seems to me to be a problem in that almost all memories are
> *not* in consciousness at any one time. So must we invoke "unconscious
> memories" (which are where?) or some other factor that provides the
> continuity of self or do we simply assert that you are no one in
> particular when you are not remembering anything. My speculation is
> that there there is subconscious "memory" on the very short term,
> ~second, which provides continuity . This operates even when you are
> asleep so that there is continuity of events in you dreams. If you
> suffer a concussion the continuity is broken and you have gap in memory
> and in consciousness. This immediate memory provides continuity between
> times when you recall long-term memories, which are the ones Quentin is
> concerned with.
I have been using the term "memories" to include more than just long
term memories. For example, I have a feeling of "being me" which
persists from moment to moment. Even though I can't put this feeling
into words, I would know immediately if something happens to change
it, since then I would no longer "feel myself". While specific to each
person, nevertheless this basal feeling would be more generic than the
feeling + superimposed complex cognition, since the latter would have
higher information content.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list.domain.name.hidden
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe.domain.name.hidden
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
Received on Sat Apr 04 2009 - 00:32:44 PDT