Hi Günther,
>> 1-OM, (by step 7, correspond to infinity (aleph_zero) of 3-OMs,
>> themselves embedded in bigger infinities (2^aleph_zero) of
>> computations going trough their corresponding states.
>> Between you-in-the-living room, and you-in-the-kitchen there is
>> already a continuum of stories/computations.
>
> I'm fine up to here.
>
>> The alien should be able to shut down the universal dovetailer. By
>
> No, they need not - see below.
>
>> I think you (momentarily perhaps?) forget the full consequence of the
>> seventh uda step. You, in the next instant, is literally determined
>> by
>> a continuum of computations+oracles executed by the UD. Thanks to
>
> I am aware of Step 7: but I don't agree that all computations need
> correspond to a continuation of an OM.
I am not saying this, but only that to compute my "next 1-OM", I have
to take into account the infinity of computations going through all 3-
OM corresponding to this 1-OMs.
>
>
> You agree that some "continuations" can actually be a non-
> continuation,
> don't you?
Yes.
> For instance, in Quantum suicide, there are versions of you
> which die (visibly for other observers) - so there are "continuations"
> of your state which code your termination.
I am a universal machine. No state of myself codes my termination. But
I can be supported by a stopping computation. At the same time I am
supported by an infinity of non stopping computations.
>
>
> I do not see following from UDA that all computational continuations
> need correspond to OMs.
All computational continuations are needed for the measure
corresponding to the 1-indeterminacy. Even more so the more my
substitution level is low. The indeterminacy itself bears on those
where I continue, and indeed this corresponds to some subset of "all
computations", but that subset has still the cardinality of the
continuum (by "simple counting").
This is a rough reasoning, only the interview of the machine can
provide the math for treating the "equivalence class aspect" of the
computations. I argue informally.
> For instance, in step 1 we say "yes doctor", but
> we don't say yes to every doctor, for instance to the one arriving
> with
> some cogwheels -> "no doctor" ;-)
Indeed :)
>
>
> So, what I am saying is that maybe in some cases (cul de sac) _all_
> (2^aleph_zero) continuations actually code for termination (=the
> teleport fails completely, but annihilation unfortunately succeeds).
But it is just plainly consistent that the annihilation *could* be not
successful, and given that all consistent computations (computation in
which *I* remain consistent are defined intrinsically in the
arithmetical relation, I don't see how such consistent computations
can be eliminated.
It is a sort of practical problem with comp: you have no way to
guaranty a self-annihilation (unless you can change the laws of
arithmetic of course).
>
>
> How can you exclude that? Are you assuming that _every_ computation is
> conscious qua computation?
No. "I" am conscious, only in the computation which supports me. Of
course, as I said, this will depend of what you mean by "you". In case
you accept the idea of surviving with amnesia, you can even get to a
state where you "know" you are immortal, because your immortality is a
"past event".
> (then I would agree -> QI; but I don't share
> that assumption, and I don't see it anywhere in UDA)
I have no idea which criteria you could use to be certain that all
your continuations will stop. If this could be true, your histories
(going through you actual state) would be enumerable, and in a sense
you would be already dead. Such computations are of negligible
measure. This is a part of comp which leads to verifiable physical
facts, like the continuum of many-worlds. If Loop Gravity is 100%
correct, and if the big bang has a finitely describable origin then
comp is false!
Our bodies can be considered programmed to stop (by sex and death),
our soul just cannot, there is always a consistent continuation (even
without amnesia (or Mitra's backtracking), but I believe the amnesic
continuation to be more "normal" than the other, but this of course is
hard to compute and in fine depend of what you will mean by "you",
something comp makes only "you" capable of defining or identifying
yourself with).
I don't like this idea, and I really wish someone find an error, but I
can't. In arithmetic there are even histories where each time your
"brain" dysfunction some alien white rabbits give you a new suitable
brain, update it with suitable subroutines, and let you continue your
universal computation. Even your current computer is immortal, from
its own pov (rather poor today). All universal machine have
2^aleph_zero continuations resilient in arithmetic, and you can feel
yourself alive in all those who doesn't stop. In the long run amnesia
makes its office (but this I just hope!).
You can program a universal machine to stop, relatively to another
universal machine. But you can't program a universal machine to stop,
from its personal view, relatively to all others universal machine,
and the 1-OM are determined by that late condition. I will have the
opportunity to go through the UDA (seventh step) again with Kim. I
suggest you polish your argument against comp-immortality until then,
perhaps.
Best wishes,
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list.domain.name.hidden
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe.domain.name.hidden
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
Received on Fri Mar 13 2009 - 05:28:51 PDT