Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

From: Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Sun, 8 Mar 2009 20:16:36 +0100

On 06 Mar 2009, at 18:06, Günther Greindl wrote:





> The idea was that the numbers encode moments which don't have
> successors
> (the guy who transports), that's why there exist alien-OMs encoded in
> numbers which destroy all the machines (if we assume that arithmetic
> is
> consistent).

Hmmm.... (Not to clear for me, I guess I miss something. I can build
to much scenario from you say here).

Of course we are in complex matter. It is good to recall that UDA is
essentially a question. It is an rgument of the kind; "did you see
that taking comp seriously the mind-body problem is two times more
complex that in the usual Aristotelian version of it. We have not only
to find a theory of mind/consciousness/psyche:soul/first-person; but
we have to extract the physical laws (laws of the observable), if
there exists any, from that theory of mind.

But now it happens that the theory of mind already exists, if we
continue to take the comp hyp seriously. Indeed, it is computer
science, alias intensional and extensional number theory (or
combinators ...). here there are the "bombs" (creative bomb) of Post
Turing ... discover of the mathemaical concept of "universal machine",
and of Gödel' Bernay Hilbert Löb's discovery of the formal probability
predicate, expressible in arithmetic, and some of its key and stable
properties, leter capture completely (at some level) by Solovay.
Roughly speaking Universal Machine + induction axioms gives Löbian
Machine, and this is the treshold she remains Lobian in all its
correct extension. It is the ultimate modest machine.

The discovery if the universal machine is a discovery is one of the
very rare "absolute" notion. It makes "computable" an absolute notion.
Now, is the universal machine really universal? That is the content,
in the digital realm, of Church Thesis.
Gödel discovery is that there is no corresponding notion of
provability. If you are interested in just arithmetical truth, truth
concerning relations between natural numbers, you cannot have a theory
or a machine enumerating all the true propositions. You will have with
chance a succession of theories: like Robinson Arithmetic, Peano
Arithmetic, Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, ZF+there is an inaccessible
cardinal, whatever ... Each of them will prove vaster and vaster
portion of arithmetical truth, but none will get the complete picture;
like us, obviously today at least.









>
>
>
>> If a successor state requires something impossible, *that* successor
>> state will be impossible, but it does not mean there will not be
>> other
>> successor states, indeed, for mind corresponding on machine's
>> state, a
>> continuum of successor states exists.
>
> This is the issue at stake: from what do you gather that all machine
> states have a continuum of successor states (the aleph_0/aleph_1 is
> not
> at issue now; it suffices to say: at least one successor state)?
>
> After all, there are halting computations.

By step seven.
A machine halt only relatively to a universal machine which executes
it. The whole problem for *us* is that we cannot not know which
univerrsal machine we are, nor really which universal machine supports
us. The UD generates your state S again, and again, and again an
infinity of time (UD-step time) in many similar and less similar
computational histories. The first person expectations have to be
defined (by UDA(1-6) on *all* computational histories. If only due to
those stupid histories dovetailing on the reals while generating your
state S, makes the cardinal of the set of all (infinite) computational
histories going through that state S a continuum.

That the "UDA" informal view.

In AUDA, the first person view is given by the conjunction of
provability with truth. We lose kripke accessibility, but we get a
richer topology, close to histories with continuous angles in between;
but it is heavily technical. Each hypostases has its own mathematics.

Surely more later,

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Received on Sun Mar 08 2009 - 15:16:48 PDT

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