On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:32, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden
>>> <mailto:marchal.domain.name.hidden>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you
>>> even in
>>> the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case
>>> he got
>>> new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in
>>> the
>>> movie "the prestige", your brother can be you. This path leads
>>> to the
>>> idea that we are already all the same person. It is "not being
>>> the
>>> other" which is an illusion in that case. I don't insist on this
>>> because we don't need to see that arithmetic is the theory of
>>> everything (and that physics comes from there). But it is
>>> needed for
>>> the "other hypostases" and the whole theological point.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>> <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>
>>>
>>>
>>> If the "copy" has no memory of being me then It's not me...
>>
>>
>> Memory is very important, and play an important role about what is to
>> have a normal personal life and history. But it could be that it is
>> not
>> a necessary (nor sufficient criteria of personal identity. After all,
>> when someone get amnesic after a car crash, we don't say that such a
>> person has died, but we say he or she has lost his or her memory.
>
> Because of continuity of the body. If we knew the person's body was
> destroyed and now someone who looked the same and had the same traits
> of character, but different memories, appeared we would say it was a
> different person who just happened to be similar - and the person
> would agree with us.
I am not sure.
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> or you mean there is something which is not memory but which is "me"
>>> (and render memory useless as primary property of the self) ?
>>
>>
>> I think this is possible. I think the answer does not depend of comp.
>> Comp is consistent with many incompatible answer. Actually I believe
>> that personal identity is a very deeply personal matter. I identify
>> myself more with moral values and attitudes, not really with
>> memories,
>> which are useful for many practical things, indeed capable of
>> implementing those values, but the values are more eternal than their
>> relative local and contingent incarnation or implementation.
>
> But those values were learned and so are that sense memories, even if
> not conscious memories. So were perhaps "hard-wired" by evolution;
> but that too is a form of memory.
>
>
>>>
>>>
>>> It is a matter of semantic but if you accept that memory is not what
>>> can be ascribe to "you" then "you/I/..." doesn't mean anything... in
>>> that sense you are me and vice-versa, and everyone is everyone but I
>>> don't see this as a theory of self identity.
>>
>>
>>
>> Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living.
>> Here
>> I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me
>> conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to
>> itself.
>> Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that
>> unique
>> person the ability to have a sort of stereoscopic view on reality.
>>
>> In some dreams, I have very different memories, yet "I" was there,
>> and
>> "I" was me.
>
> Isn't that because "you" remember the dream when you are awake and can
> compare the memories?
That would be a reason to doubt I was me.
>
>
>> To get amnesic, even irreversibly, is not dying, even if it
>> is a big impediment in practical life, and it should be avoided,
>> unless
>> it is reversible (and then it procure an interesting experience (the
>> main reason i am fascinated by nocturnal dreams, and since
>> recently, in
>> salvia reports).
>>
>> Memories, like body and brain are things we possess, and this
>> means, I
>> think, that we can still survive without them.
>
> I'm doubtful. I suspect that "I" is a construct of the brain, part of
> how it makes sensible story of the world. You call it a useful
> fiction - but just because it's a story, doesn't mean it's fiction.
I think "I" is a logical construction (we will come back on this).
Memories have a big values, but "I" don't put it in my identity, nor
would I put the content of my books in my identity. But as I say, this
could be personal stuff.
>
>
>>
>> Suppose that I die tomorrow, and that sometimes after someone find a
>> backup of "me" at the age of five, so that "I" am reconstituted from
>> that backup. Would you say I am dead, or would you say that I have
>> survived, only with a severe sort of amnesy ?
>
> Dead.
I ask what I just asked to Quentin: what if the backup has been done
last year or a minute ago, or a second ago?
Did I died this night, given that I don't remember the dreams I made?
We are in the subtle à-la "The prestige" water ...
Best,
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Received on Fri Feb 27 2009 - 02:04:00 PST