Re: Personal Identity and Memory

From: Stephen Paul King <stephenk1.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Mon, 23 Feb 2009 13:23:56 -0500

Hi Brent,
----- Original Message -----
From: "Brent Meeker" <meekerdb.domain.name.hidden>
To: <everything-list.domain.name.hidden>
Sent: Monday, February 23, 2009 12:46 PM
Subject: Re: Personal Identity and Memory [was Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker,
Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]


>
> Stephen Paul King wrote:
snip
>> Hi Brent and Quentin,
>>
>> Could it be that it is the continuous possibility of recall from
>> memory
>> itself and not just the occasional recall acts that are important to
>> continuity of P.I.?
>>
>> Stephen
> Sure. But what provides that possibility - the causal (physical)
> continuity of the brain and body.
>
> Brent

    This is why I am very timid about accepting Platonic idealist theories,
for they seemed to inevitably relegate consciousness to some sort of
epiphenomena ridding on top of another epiphenomenon: the material universe.
Frankly, I find that some dualist theories do not have this problem whereas
monist theories have the problem of epiphenomena. OTOH, I do find Bruno's
theory to be very interesting. ;)

    If the material universe is "just as real" as the universe of number or
thought or whatever form the idealist theories propose, we only need to show
how the duals are related and how dynamics can follow. See:
http://chu.stanford.edu/guide.html#ratmech

Onward!

Stephen


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Received on Mon Feb 23 2009 - 13:23:50 PST

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