Again, anthropic reasoning should start with the idea that this thought is a
representative thought among thoughts - not assume that you are a
representative physical human.  But I think this thread is getting lost out
there ...
James
> -----Original Message-----
> From:	Marchal [SMTP:marchal.domain.name.hidden]
> Sent:	Friday, January 07, 2000 11:02 AM
> To:	Russell Standish
> Cc:	everything-list.domain.name.hidden
> Subject:	Re: The Game of Life
> 
> >This touches on a philosophical conundrum I have. Like Bruno, I too
> >attribute conciousness to some animals. eg a number of dogs I know
> >seem to be concious at an intuitive level. As the previous discussion
> >followed, conciousness appears to be reflexive in some manner, even if
> >indirectly.
> >
> >My problem is with the Anthropic principle. If conciousness is all
> >that is needed to "instantiate" an interesting universe, then why do
> >we even understand what the anthropic principle is? Presumably dogs do
> >not wonder why the universe has the form it does. Why do we?
> >
> >There has to be some good reason why the reference class must be
> >human-like, i.e. able to understand philosophical issues such as the
> >anthropic principle.
> 
> 
> There are no good reasons, I think, to take human-like reference 
> class in 'scientific' (let us say) matter. And I do not.
> 
> I appreciate the Anthropic Principle though. I am convinced of the 
> benefit of weak Anthropic-like reasoning.
> 
> Actually you touch my principal motivation for substituting the
> human observer by the machine observer.
> 
> A lot of reasoning can be done with the more vague 'Self-Aware 
> Substructure', (which does not need to be a machine) but as you know I 
> give a special role to the SRC UTM.  (SRC = Self Referentially 
> Correct).
> 
> Why animals does not wonder why the universe has the form it does?
> I think that animals are SRC in some sense (after all living animals
> did succeed the "evolution test"). But animals lack some degree
> of introspectiveness. Animals knows but does not know they know.
> 
> When you simulate throwing a piece of wood in front of a dog, the
> dog can show some sense of astonishment though. 
> 
> But religions and fundamental sciences begin with astonishment 
> in front of the banal, when you stop taking for granted the very
> nature of the apparantly obvious. This need higher introspective
> power, and higher communication means, for exemple to remember 
> and talk about dreams. 
> 
> Look at Smullyan's description(°) of advancing stages of
> self-awareness page 89 (either in the hard or paperback edition).
> 
> Human-like interrogations begin perhaps with the Smullyan's stage 4
> where the 'reasoner' is able to know that it knows.
> More on that modal stuff later ...
> 
> Regards,
> Bruno
> 
> (°) Raymond Smullyan : FOREVER UNDECIDED
> Hardback: 1987, Alfred A. KNOPF, New York.
> Paperback: 1988, Oxford University Press.
Received on Fri Jan 07 2000 - 03:25:08 PST
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