2009/1/29 Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
>
> On 28 Jan 2009, at 21:25, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
> 2009/1/28 Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
>
>>
>>
>> Hi Quentin,
>>
>> > I was thinking about the movie graph and its conclusions. It
>> > concludes that it is absurd for the connsciousness to supervene on
>> > the movie hence physical supervenience is false.
>>
>>
>> OK. It is a reductio ad absurdo. It assumes that consciousness
>> supervenes on the physical activity of a brain (Phys. Sup.), it shows
>> that it leads to the fact that consciousness suoervenes on a movie
>> "qua computatio", and this is considered as an absurdity, and so it
>> concludes that Phys. Sup is false.
>>
>>
>> >
>> >
>> > But if I simulate the graph with a program, and having for exemple
>> > each gates represented by a function like "out = f(in)" each
>> > functions of the simulated graph is in a library which is loaded
>> > dynamically. I can record a run and then on new run I can
>> > selectively replace each libraries/functions by another one with the
>> > same function contract but which instead of computing the out value,
>> > it takes the value from the record. I can do it like in the movie
>> > graph for each gates/functions.
>> >
>> > Then it seems that means in the end the consciousness has to
>> > supervene on the record...
>>
>> Why? Consciousness supervenes on the computation(s), not on his
>> physical implementation, be it with record or with the original modules.
>>
>>
>> > then it is the same conclusion than for physical supervenience. What
>> > is wrong ?
>>
>> The physical supervenience. Consciousness does not supervene on any
>> implementation "in particular" of a computation. It supervenes on all
>> (immaterial) computations going through the (relevant) states. This is
>> in Platonia.
>>
>> Tell me if I miss something, but it seems to me there is no problem
>> here. It is just, again, a problem if you believe in some physical
>> supervenience.
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>
> The problem I see is that the movie graph is used to show that phys-sup is
> wrong (having as condition that I know consciousness is turing-emulable, as
> we have a "conscious" graph which is the physical implementation), the
> argument shows that consciousness does not supervene on this physical
> implementation because we should be forced to accept it also supervene upon
> broken graph + movie. But what I think with my exemple is that it does not
> supervene on the particular simulation of the functionnal graph nor does it
> supervene on the non-functionnal lookup record sumulation of the graph.
>
> I understand the thing is that it supervene on all computations not a
> particular computation... but I don't see how then movie graph rules out
> phys sup and not any kind of supervenience.
>
>
>
>
> Why would the movie graph rule out a notion of *computational*
> supervenience. We can keep comp and abandon materialism. We can still say
> yes to the digitalist doctor, by betting on our more probable
> relative computational histories.
>
Because here there was no "physical" graph at the start... it's just a
program and we replace various subpart of it which instead of computing make
a lookup. Now frow what you are saying I should understand that the program
is a "description" of a computation, not a computation and "consciousness"
supervene on computation but not description of computation ? Then I'm lost
about what is a computation ? I would thing a computation is the act of
"running" the program, execute each step and modifying the internal state.
I'm talking about a modified version of the movie graph where instead of
starting with a conscious physical gates machine, I start with a conscious
program and transform it accordingly (broken gates + projection of the film
in the movie graph, in my case, stub subpart which do a lookup instead of
computing the value)
>
> The absurdity with the movie graph is that it shows that associating
> consciousness to the *physical* implementation leads us to attribute
> consciousness to a description of a computation, and that is ridiculous.
> (Well at least, once you understand what is a (mathematical) computation, I
> think many are confused here, I will come back on this).
> Computations and descriptions of computation are related, but differs and
> are not of the same type, nor level. It is hard to be clearer without going
> through computer science. Probably more in my next post to Kim on the
> Seventh Step.
>
> I am not really sure I get your "ruling out all kinds of supervenience".
>
Because from what I understand (which is surely wrong) it's absurd at all...
(supervenience of consciousness) :
from wikipedia:
A supervenes on a set of properties B, if and only if any two objects x and
y which share all properties in B (are
"B-indiscernible<
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indiscernible>")
must also share all properties in A (are "A-indiscernible").
Regards,
Quentin
Regards,
> Bruno
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>
>
>
>
>
> >
>
--
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list.domain.name.hidden
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe.domain.name.hidden
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
Received on Thu Jan 29 2009 - 14:42:29 PST