Re: The Game of Life

From: Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Wed Dec 22 10:48:58 1999

George Levy wrote:

>I believe that zombiness just as consciousness is a relative property.
>
>As relative properties they requires an observer and an observee.
>
>Consciousness as a 1st person phenomenon arise when the observer observes
>him(her)self -- that is looks at his or her own INTERNAL MODEL. The
>observer/ee then falls into a infinite regress in which he or she is
>unpredictable to him/herself. Hence comes the illusion of free will and the
>"I", "le Moi."
>
>However, it can also be a third person property. In this case, when the
>observer is more sophisticated than the observee ( can predict the observee
>behavior, then the observee will be perceived to be a zombie.) When the
>observee is unpredictable from the point of view of the observer, then the
>observee will be perceived as being conscious.

This seems to me an interesting theory. Though I think there is an
absolute
feature in consciousness seen as an 1-person experience. I am not sure
free will is an illusion, even in a deterministic world. I am not sure
that "I" or "le moi" are illusory from the 1-person point of view. For
very more sophisticated beings than us, your "theory" would literally
justify for them a right to kill us. I think that such being, although
they
can predict our behavior, should be wise to realise that we can't, but
that
maybe we can infer that, so they should realise that from our point of
view
we could be "really" conscious, and that it is not an illusion.
That is at least an "ethical" critics of your theory. But without changing
a lot your theory, you could accept that consciousness from the 1-person
point of view is absolute, and still relative from the 3-person
description.
This would even enlarge the link I propose between consciousness and
instinctive inference of self-consistency.
I must still think about it.

Bruno
Received on Wed Dec 22 1999 - 10:48:58 PST