Bruno,
I think you are right in calling this view eliminative materialism. I
am saying that the "I" is a convenient fiction.
> Hmmm... If you were correct, it seems to me you should say "he" when
> you talk about yourself in the future. I love coffee so he will drink
> coffee.
Maybe "We love coffee, so we will drink coffee" (with "we" referring
to many moment-selves). Or, perhaps, "Abram loves coffee, so Abram
will drink coffee" (no identification of a self, only of an identity).
> It is also a pity to think that you will die the time I finish this
> sentence. You think now you have survived that reading, but you
> did'nt, you are the copy.
Since all possible moments exist, that old self did not die. My
after-reading consciousness can observe that it is not the
before-reading consciousness, and the before-reading consciousness
could observe that it is not the after-reading consciousness, but that
is all. There is no switching from one to the other, since that would
require time (which does not exist). :)
Of course, that is where I-as-time-skeptic have trouble knowing what
it means to choose. I can understand being-in-a-state-of-choosing, but
I refuse to accept the cause/effect reasoning that gos along with that
state. (In other words, I can understand choosing from the 3rd person
perspective, but cannot understand it from the 1st person
perspective.)
--Abram
On Mon, Dec 22, 2008 at 3:16 PM, Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>
>
> I wrote:
>
>
>
>> Abram wrote
>>>
>>> --When I tell you my bet about which movie I will see, I am not
>>> minimizing the chance of being condemned to hell, I am minimizing the
>>> number of my copies that will be so carried.
>>
>> ?
>
>
> OK. I was distracted. To do this by altruism? And *you* (in your
> sense) you die.
> Is this what you mean?
>
> And you say "yes" to the doctor because you die at each instant.
>
> And you still care about the quality and seriousness of the doctor
> because you care by altruism for the copy.
>
> With MEC we have indeed this at each instant ( through QM or not).
>
> But then, you will have to think about anything you do in the future
> as an act of altruism. You take a cigarette because you care about the
> satisfaction feeling of the "copy" who will smoke it, and you abandon
> the cigarette because you care of the lungs of the copies of the future.
>
> Egoism as pure self-altruisme, why not? But then, assuming MEC, any
> statement of any laws (physical, arithmetical, juridic, etc.) concerns
> our copies, and this means that taking this point of view or not is
> not relevant in the reasoning, we have still to derive the laws, be it
> by altruism or egoism according to the interpretation of identity.
>
> Hmmm... If you were correct, it seems to me you should say "he" when
> you talk about yourself in the future. I love coffee so he will drink
> coffee.
>
> I think that if you put yourself in the place of the polycopies, none
> will feel like that except a few exception. I mean the quasi-tautology
> that none *feels* dying at each instant. You have to meditate eight
> hours per day during eight years or to eat or smoke something
> (legal!), or to die, or perhaps to dream for PERHAPS get a feeling of
> what dying could be, according to some.
>
> But your view is coherent and rather cool too, so let us continue the
> UDA reasoning, by altruism for *all* our descendants and why not the
> many others descendant to:)
>
> It is also a pity to think that you will die the time I finish this
> sentence. You think now you have survived that reading, but you
> did'nt, you are the copy.
>
> Computability can be thought as a topological notion. MEC is the
> assumption that I, and my continuous life, is preserved in
> teleportation, and polyplication (duplication and other self-
> multiplication).
>
> (I know you are playing the role of the "time person skeptic").
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
> >
>
--
Abram Demski
Public address: abram-demski.domain.name.hidden
Public archive: http://groups.google.com/group/abram-demski
Private address: abramdemski.domain.name.hidden
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Received on Mon Dec 22 2008 - 18:23:52 PST