On 13 Dec 2008, at 18:27, John Mikes wrote:
> Bruno wrote:
>
> "...I am not my body - I am not my brain --
> I can change everything and anything I want about me and still
> remain me ergo "I" am an immaterial something: probably a number or
> a very long bitstring which can, like any data, be crunched..."
Kim wrote this, but it is ok, I almost agree with KIm. Almost because,
at some point we have to distinguish the 1-I and the 3-I. The 1-I will
be unameable, and is not a string or a number. It is a person. But
assuming comp, a person can be encoded locally through a brain/body/
program/number.combinators/whatever finite and useful relatively to
the most probable computational histories.
> *
> I like the 'probably', with a 'meaningless' word to answer the
> unanswered question (What am I?) and the same with the 'bitstring'
> kind.
>
> Bruno, I wonder if you 'mean' BRAIN as part of your (material?!)
> body ONLY, restricted to physiology and physical (figment) data? I
> don't think so.
> Suppose we agree to call 'brain' the function of ideation included
> as well which leaps into the Chalmers's hard problem, but definitely
> more than just the goo in our skull. I call it a complexity of
> unlisted parts, one of them the 'goo': the tool to manipulate mental
> aspects in a sense described in the figment-details of the physical
> world. We have in conventional science a (reductionist) description
> how the brain might work and shove all the unknown functions into
> open "SOMEHOW"-s.
> It may even go beyond 'numbers' since they, too, are within the
> manipulations of the figment. Would you have another 'word'?
I do the assumption of computationalism. A (generalized) brain, in
UDA, is any portion of the universe, or my neighborhood, that I have
to copy for surviving in the usual sense (keeping my mental and
physical heath for example) through the copy.
In UDA[1...6] I simplify the thought experience by identifying that
generalized brain with the organic matter in the skull, but such
simplifying assumption is eliminated at the seventh step.
>
> (Conventional science - with all its 'empirics' - is based on
> assumptions to explain what we could not understand in phenomena
> halfway perceived. So it is a kind of religion with a bit different
> vocabulary. So much to your 'score':
> Science - 1 --- Religion - 1.)
>
> Please, do not say: "mind", without identifying properly what you
> mean by that.
By mind I mean anything which can be experienced by any machine (this
include the human mind by the comp hypothesis).
Thus, mind includes pleasure, pain, conviction, astonishment, feeling
this or that real, all the illusions, etc.
> Also "body" is suspect (see the 1st line of this text).
The reasoning is made for helping the process of making "body" more
and more suspect, at least in his substantial primitive or materialist
form.
>
> I am scared to apply half-way the eliminated conventional
> (figmentous) concepts together with th 'new' ideas similarly halfway
> identified.
> I wouldn't call such wording "too technical".
No problems. Please ask when things are unclear,
Best
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Received on Sun Dec 14 2008 - 11:10:35 PST