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From: Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Tue, 9 Dec 2008 18:45:50 +0100

Hi Kim,

On 02 Dec 2008, at 00:16, Kim Jones wrote:

*>>
*

*>> To explain that the world is (mostly) mathematical (and then psycho
*

*>> or
*

*>> bio or theo logical), without mathematics, can be demanding.
*

*>
*

*>
*

*> OK - accepted; I get this from mathematicians and physicists all the
*

*> time - and I have quite a few as friends. Nevertheless, if there was
*

*> one human on the planet who could do it, or at the very best make a
*

*> heroic attempt at it, I reckon YOU'RE THE ONE!!!!!
*

*>
*

*> Court jesters like me cannot understand mathematics, but we understand
*

*> the 'realities' described by mathematics through a kind of sixth
*

*> sense. We are also very good judges of character. Tu peux te sauver,
*

*> mais tu ne peux pas m'eschapper!!!
*

Here, below, is the plan of my heroic attempt (indeed) to explain why

I think that: IF we assume that we are machine, THEN we have to

explain or even to reduce eventually physics from a tiny part of

elementary arithmetic.

Today most scientists believe that the "theory of everything" is

mainly SWE + Mechanism. They believe that there is a physical

universe, that it obeys SWE (Schroedinger Wave Equation), and more and

more believe in Everett explanation of the mind. In particular they

believe in Everett mechanist explanation of why the machine's mind

"observes" indeterminacy and wave collapses.

What I pretend is that if we accept Everett (and Descartes) Mechanist

explanation of the mind, then we *have to* complete Everett work by

justifying the SWE itself from the the mechanist assumption.

Physics will have to be (re)defined by what is invariant for all

possible observers (and I agree that many evidences point on the

correctness of the SWE (or its relativistic variant)).

In this lists most people are open minded to the idea of the existence

of all possible worlds, either in the QM Everett form, or in more

general modal realist view (à la David Lewis) or in term of

computations, or mind states (Observer moment). It is the idea that

"everything" is more easy to explain than "something".

The way I proceed is purely deductive. I show that the hypothesis of

digital mechanism constraint physics so much that a physics is

derivable from arithmetic (+ digital mechanism (UDA) and even, in some

sense, without (AUDA)), and that physics can then be compared to our

empirically inferred physics, and that this makes mechanism

empirically testable.

Many things can happen: for example one of my first (very old) attempt

to derive physics has led to classical logic. If that was correct, it

would have mean that our physics is mainly a local, geographic-

historical fact, contingent and not derivable from arithmetic. The

correct derivation leads to a many worlds or many histories kind of

theory. It is a many world interpretation of Elementary Arithmetic;

where, a bit like in Everett, the interpretations is not done by us,

but by the numbers themselves relatively to the others numbers. That

is why at some point we will have to interview some number.

Date: Tue, 9 Dec 2008 18:45:50 +0100

Hi Kim,

On 02 Dec 2008, at 00:16, Kim Jones wrote:

Here, below, is the plan of my heroic attempt (indeed) to explain why

I think that: IF we assume that we are machine, THEN we have to

explain or even to reduce eventually physics from a tiny part of

elementary arithmetic.

Today most scientists believe that the "theory of everything" is

mainly SWE + Mechanism. They believe that there is a physical

universe, that it obeys SWE (Schroedinger Wave Equation), and more and

more believe in Everett explanation of the mind. In particular they

believe in Everett mechanist explanation of why the machine's mind

"observes" indeterminacy and wave collapses.

What I pretend is that if we accept Everett (and Descartes) Mechanist

explanation of the mind, then we *have to* complete Everett work by

justifying the SWE itself from the the mechanist assumption.

Physics will have to be (re)defined by what is invariant for all

possible observers (and I agree that many evidences point on the

correctness of the SWE (or its relativistic variant)).

In this lists most people are open minded to the idea of the existence

of all possible worlds, either in the QM Everett form, or in more

general modal realist view (à la David Lewis) or in term of

computations, or mind states (Observer moment). It is the idea that

"everything" is more easy to explain than "something".

The way I proceed is purely deductive. I show that the hypothesis of

digital mechanism constraint physics so much that a physics is

derivable from arithmetic (+ digital mechanism (UDA) and even, in some

sense, without (AUDA)), and that physics can then be compared to our

empirically inferred physics, and that this makes mechanism

empirically testable.

Many things can happen: for example one of my first (very old) attempt

to derive physics has led to classical logic. If that was correct, it

would have mean that our physics is mainly a local, geographic-

historical fact, contingent and not derivable from arithmetic. The

correct derivation leads to a many worlds or many histories kind of

theory. It is a many world interpretation of Elementary Arithmetic;

where, a bit like in Everett, the interpretations is not done by us,

but by the numbers themselves relatively to the others numbers. That

is why at some point we will have to interview some number.

--- Hmmm... perhaps I am already completely not understandable. Have you heard about Everett? Have you an opinion on the plausibility of the "physical many-worlds"? If not, this is not so important. It helps to make links with other posts, and it can help to believe what we will deduce from mechanism, because it is easier for a "many-worlder" to believe in those "many" type consequences than it is for any mono-worlder. Have you an idea of what *is* a universal purpose computer, and how does it function? This is not needed for the "theological" point, but it is needed to have an idea of what is going on, and eventually why arithmetic is enough. The universal machine is really the main heroin here. You have the right to remain silent of course. But it could help me to have an idea. I could have take much more distance, and (more provocatively) told you that, since we are animals, we have been programmed for instinctively betting on a solid neighborhood, which we take as our universe, if not of our home, ... and that Modernity begins, in -500, in Occident, when Pythagorus sum up the math he discovered through his travels. Through Plato this gives a new picture of reality where the physical appearance were conceived as the border or shadow of a deeper perhaps divine reality. We did take some distance with that instinctive program. So did science begin, including theology, ... and that, in Occident Modernity ended in +500, when Plato Academy has been closed. Since then it is still hard to harbor doubt in "theology"(be it theist or atheist), a problem because science is the art of harboring doubt, imo. Enlightenment has been only half Enlightenment: Jewish and Arabs provided the greek science to the European, but with the greek theology or better the greek attitude in theology missing, such attitude is and was qualified as pagan. Why theology? because we will see that finite machine have a tendency to develop theories about the infinite, the uncomputable, the unprovable, the non observable etc. This plays a key role, if only to eventually justify the quanta (as very peculiar sort of first person plural qualia). But perhaps here I am taking too much distance? Only your feedback could help us to find the genuine wavelength between us. Anyway Kim, here is the plan. For point "1)" and "2)", I will really assume very little; and the "layman" should understand without any trouble. For "3)", I can explain or give the "real thing". In that last case, we have to do some, rather little, amount of math (diagonalization). For "B", I can again explain in english, at the risk of seeming unbelievable (if not mad), or give you the real thing, but then the amount of math is far more considerable. A) UDA (Universal Dovetailer Argument) 1) I explain that if you are a machine, you are already immaterial. 2) Mechanism entails the existence of a subjective or first person indeterminacy or uncertainty. 3) The Universal Machine, the Universal Dovetailer and the reversal physics/bio-psycho-theo-whatever-logy. B) AUDA (Arithmetical or Abstract Universal Dovetailer Argument). 1) Ontology: Robinson Arithmetic 2) Epistemology: Peano Arithmetic 3) Arithmetical Interpretation of Plotinus (including Plotinus theory of Matter). OK? Feel free to make any comment. I am still unsure about what you really want. You show me you know french, so I could also eventually refer you to my "long thesis", it is entirely self-contained, except for the deduction and completeness theorem in logic. It is also as accurate as possible on the history of Mechanism, one of the oldest human theory. Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list.domain.name.hidden To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe.domain.name.hidden For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---Received on Tue Dec 09 2008 - 12:46:08 PST

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