Re: Consciousness and free will

From: Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2008 09:44:57 +0100

On 04 Dec 2008, at 00:29, M.A. wrote:

> Hi Bruno,
> I'm quoting your response to an older post because I
> have a residual question. If "I" improve my ability to select the
> best future outcomes, don't "I" also choose the worst ones according
> to MWI and the rule of sum-over-histories? I seem to be competing
> against myself. M.A.


Assuming just Everett QM, there is a notion of normality and
classicality which can be derived from the quantum evolution. This is
expalined by david Deutsch, but also the "decoherence theory". So,
when you take a (classical) decision you will act accordingly in the
vast majority of your histories, and very few version of you will
accidentally be doing the opposite.
Taking into account the comp. Hyp. such "decoherence" has to be
refined a priori, and this leads to a gallery of open problems.
Both with QM without collapse, and with comp, such normality is hard
to justified from the first person views when we are "near death".
This leads to even more complex questions. I can only say that I don't
know what happens, but I do expect, some probable "jump", guided by
some theoretical computer science intuition. Some backtracking of
experience, and renormalization of probabilities could also occur.
Many-histories is not "all histories", or it is "all histories" but
with different relative weight. We can't use MW for escaping our
"responsibilities", I think.


Bruno

>
>>
>> At some point I could "defined" consciousness as the state of
>> (instinctively at first) betting on a history. This will speed up
>> yourself relatively to your current stories, and make greater the
>> set of your possible continuation. As an exemple you become aware
>> an astero´d is coming nearby make it possible for you to envisage a
>> set of possible decisions, which can themselves augment your
>> probability of survival.
>>
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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Received on Fri Dec 05 2008 - 03:45:14 PST

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