Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 14 Nov 2008, at 01:19, Kory Heath wrote:
>
>
>> On Nov 13, 2008, at 9:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> Be careful with the term. The MGA is subtle and to explain it we will
>>> have to be more precise. For example here it is better to remember
>>> that only *person* are conscious. Computations are not conscious (be
>>> it soft or hard wired).
>>>
>> Good point. What's the most concise way to say it? "I believe that
>> persons represented by unimplemented computations are conscious"?
>>
>
>
>
>
> Hmmm... I am afraid this is not yet OK, but take it easy, it helps to
> realize the presence of some difficulties here. I got the same
> impression with the discussion about zombie.
>
> For someone who believes explicitly in naturalism or materialism, all
> your definitions are correct (and will be used in the MGA reduction ad
> absurdo which will follow). But now we can "redefined", or even just
> *use* the *same definition* (of term like zombie, or implementation)
> without interpreting them necessarily in a materialist background.
>
> For example, a zombie is just some entity which looks like you and me,
> i.e. has all the appearance of a human, and who has no consciousness.
> There is no *need* to make them a priori fundamentally material. Now a
> materialist can and even should interpret this as a zombie in the
> sense of Dennett, but the definition continues to make sense for a non
> materialist, who for example just consider itself that physics is
> implemented or emerge from something else. It shows that the notion of
> zombie does not depend on the materialist or non materialist belief. A
> zombie is just something NON conscious despite it has all the
> appearance of a human like you and me (and thus is material for a
> materialist, and immaterial for an immaterialist).
>
> The same for implementation or incarnation, or instantiation of a
> program or an idea. A materialist will interpret (by default) the term
> as "material implementation", but a non materialist can still believe
> in the (very important of course) notion of implementation, even of
> sort of quasi-"material" implementation: this would mean for him/her
> "implementation in or relatively to the most probable computations".
>
I don't see this. For a non-materialist it seems that an un-implemented
idea or program is an incoherent concept. So for the non-materialist
there can be no such distinction as "implemented" or "not implemented".
But then what can it mean to refer to an "implementation relative to the
most probable computations"?
Brent
> So we agree that a computation is not conscious.
> That only a person can be conscious (accepting that eventually we have
> to make the notion of person a bit more precise)
>
> Now a computationalist cannot say "I believe that persons represented
> by unimplemented computations are conscious" for the reason that all
> computations have to be implemented". Indeed, most computer programmer
> used the term "implementation" followed by "in Fortran" (or java,
> lisp, etc.).
>
> A machine A can implement machine B, when there is a number (program)
> x such that the machine Ax behaves like B. Universal machine are
> machine capable of implementing all machines.
>
> (and UDA+MGA shows the necessity of something like "arithmetic
> implement all universal machines whose "dreams" (sharable first person
> stories) cohere into "physical histories" which then locally implement
> these universal machine into person.
>
> To economize conflict of words it is useful to put large
> interpretation of those words, so that we can extract the genuine
> difference of understandings. A zombie is material only for someone
> who take for granted matter, like an implementation is material only
> if you take matter fro granted.
>
> I think I could be clearer. But I will stop here. Except for:
>
>
>
>>
>>> Perhaps the time has come I explain the MGA on the list? Would you be
>>> interested? It seems that both you and Stathis already accept the
>>> conclusion. So ...
>>>
>> No need to do it just on my account, but yes, I'm interested.
>>
>
>
> With pleasure.. Thanks for telling me. I have no more choice
> apparently! I will think about and send MGA step 1, .... asap.
>
> Bruno
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
> >
>
>
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Received on Fri Nov 14 2008 - 14:22:12 PST