Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 10 Nov 2008, at 17:34, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden
>> <mailto:marchal.domain.name.hidden>> wrote:
>>
>>
>> PS I think I see the point that you are still missing. I will have to
>> explain that whatever the physical universe is, in the case I am
>> Turing
>> emulable, the physical universe is NOT turing emulable.
>>
>>
>> Bruno, this was the item I was asking (or at least had meant to ask)
>> you about several days ago. But it was phrased differently,
>> something like "If I am the universe and the universe is not turning
>> emulable then comp is false" Here you are saying the universe is not
>> turning emulable, so if comp is true that implies "I != universe". I
>> look forward to your explanation of why the universe is not Turing
>> emulable. BTW: Does this apply to just the Everett Universe, or are
>> there other conceivable universes which are emulable in addition to
>> the observers they might contain?
>
>
> Hmmm... Normally, once you grasp all the steps up to 8, or grasp
> UDA(1...7) and accept provisorily #8 for the sake of the argument, you
> should worry if the notion of universe still make sense at all.
>
> How can you be sure all the computation going through your current
> state glues into a coherent physical reality? If you grasp 1...8 or
> 1...7, you should understand it is up to you to justify why a universe
> makes sense, or exists at all, and in case it makes sense, why should
> it be computable. If it was shown to be computable, it would mean the
> white rabbits have been evacuated already.
>
> If you agree that comp entails white rabbits, you already know that
> the comp physics is non computable. We cannot evacuate any of those
> white rabbits, they are there in "arithmetic". We can only hope (if we
> want keep mechanism and the appearance of naturalism) that there is an
> explanation why the white rabbits are *relatively* rare.
>
> And I am not assuming Everett in any way, nor even QM. On the
> contrary, what I try to explain, is that, IF you take seriously the
> Mechanist Hypothesis into account, THEN you can no more assume the
> existence of a physical universe. If you still believe in lawful ways
> to predict and anticipate our neighborhoods' behaviors, you have to
> extract an explanation of those predictions from a theory of (gluing)
> computations. IF QM is true (which I tend to believe), then you have
> to justify QM entirely from computations or numbers. Including the
> geometrical and topological background.
>
> The role of QM and especially through Everett's formulation of QM, is
> that QM is a witness that the empirical observations already confirm
> some of the most startling prediction of comp, like the indirect many
> evidences for the many histories, and (with AUDA) the quantum logical
> behavior of the certain propositions.
>
> The universal dovetailer does dovevtail on the quantum Universal
> solutions of the SWE, and thanks to Feynman (and Everett, Deutsch) we
> know how those Universal Quantum solutions do evacuate the *quantum
> white rabbits*.
Unfortunately, I don't think we do know that, c.f. the paper by Dowker
and Kent on Griffith's Consistent Histories interpretation.
http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/gr-qc/pdf/9412/9412067v2.pdf
Brent
> But if we assume mechanism, we can no more postulate the SWE, we have
> to extract it from all computations, meaning evacuate vaster sets of
> white rabbits. We cannot, by 1-inedtermincay in front of the UD,
> localize ourselves in any computational histories, we belong to all of
> them, and nothing a priori indicates that the result is a computable
> things.
>
> The moral is this. Mechanism provides a cute theory of mind, roughly
> speaking it is computer science/mathematical logic. But then there is
> a big price, we have to (re)explain all what we know and observe about
> the body and the apparent universe. We can no more invoke the
> existence of a lawful structure, we have to explain it from the theory
> of mind/numbers.
>
> Do you are completely aware of the 1-3 distinction when doing the
> seven step of the thought experiment/experience?
>
> Don't hesitate to ask again if this does not help, I feel I miss what
> you don't understand.
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>
>
>
>
>
> >
--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list.domain.name.hidden
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe.domain.name.hidden
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
Received on Tue Nov 11 2008 - 14:10:38 PST