Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

From: Bruno Marchal <>
Date: Fri, 7 Nov 2008 19:07:25 +0100

On 07 Nov 2008, at 08:51, Kory Heath wrote:

> On Nov 5, 2008, at 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Just consider the computation which correspond to your actual real
>> life. That computation is encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in
>> the
>> Universal Deploiement, which is itself encoded (indeed an infinity of
>> times) in the set of all arithmetical truth. All right? Such a
>> computation would define an arithmetical version of you, and would
>> constitute a phisophical (indeed arithmetical) zombies.
> I see what you mean, but most philosophers wouldn't be willing to
> count un-implemented computations as zombies. For instance, Daniel
> Dennett is a well-known opponent of philosophical zombies, but I don't
> think he considers the hypothetical creatures in some cellular-
> automaton to be conscious unless that cellular-automaton is
> implemented in some physical way.

Yes but Dennett takes matter for granted (no more conceptual problem
in physics, he says).

> In the standard view, believing in
> philosophical zombies means believing that it's logically possible for
> there to be a physical copy of me that's identical to me in every
> physical way, except that it's not conscious. (Like Dennett, I think
> that's logically impossible.)

  It is not easy for me to explain, the easiest explanation depends of
what you have already understand.
I should do exams or things like that :)

Arithmetical truth, and even an important *tiny*, but not so tiny,
part of arithmetical truth contains, encodes, defines, implements, the
running of a universal dovetailer going through all possible mind
states, through all possible computations, containing notably
relations between bodies like in the more cellular automata type of
It is a bit astonishing, but a tiny part of arithmetic contains
description of our third person current conversation, including
everything you need as far as you cut the description of somewhere. So
you can talk about those entities as zombies, once we decide that they
are not conscious, despite they act and behave like us in many
stories, meaning with the right counterfactual, etc.

In truth, *I* could reverse the game, and ask you what you mean by
physics and physical. What is matter? That is the mystery for me. This
is what truly interest me. I don't buy that theory saying simply "the
physical Universe exist". But I don't, play that game because UDA+MGA
is really a logical argument justifying that: IF you buy the
mechanist theory of the mind, THEN you have to drop out the primary-
materialist or substantialist explanation of matter.
Fuch and Pauli and Wigner have defended already similar interpretation
for QM.
I think they are correct, except that, well Fuch explicitely, want a
singular physical universe. This can't work with COMP or even with a
vast hierarchy of weakening of comp.

To sum up. Our problem is that I agree with you and Dennett that a
physical zombie cannot exist, (and for the same reason), but assuming
comp, there is no such thing as a physical thing, giving another
reason. The days where I decide to believe in comp, I don't believe
in physical things, be it zombie or people, in general. Those days I
don't believe that people or person are physical. A physical thing,
with comp, does not exist per se, it can only be a map of our personal
ignorance of the story we are in (a bit like an electronic orbital is
a map of the unknown computation story of the position of the electron
relatively to your measurements).

Do you understand that if comp is false, then arithmetical truth
contains (immaterial) zombies (because it contains already the
relative implementations of all solutions of Schroedinger equations
and variant, if only that for example ...)?
It contains fictions, if you want, but as precise as us to say, the
level of *description* of the quantum strings, again as a picture. Do
you see what I mean?


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Received on Fri Nov 07 2008 - 13:07:33 PST

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