Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)

From: GŁnther Greindl <>
Date: Thu, 06 Nov 2008 18:49:22 +0100

Hello Bruno,

> More exactly: I can conceive fake policemen in paper are not conscious,
> and that is all I need to accept I can be fail by some zombie.
> Thus I can conceive zombies.

Ok, but conceivability does not entail possibilty. I think philosophical
zombies are impossible (=not able to exist in the real world), not

> Developing this argument makes zombies logically conceivable, even, if
> I would refute the claim that a zombie acting exactly like I would act
> in any situation can exist. Accidental zombie can exist. It could
> depend what we put exactly in the term zombie.

Ok, I agree with that.

>> and here you clarify:
>>> If this were true, then the movie graph (step 8 without occam) would
>>> not been needed. Arithmetical truth is provably full of philosophical
>>> zombies if comp is true and step 8 false.

Hmm - in step 8 you eliminate the physical universe, which is ok *grin*
- but why would arithmetical truth be full of zombies with comp true and
  step 8 false -> physicalism true? do you mean because we could than
program AIs which would behave "correctly" but would not be conscious?

> So it is just a theorem in computer science: computations are encodable
> (and thus encoded) in the (additive+multiplicative) relations existing
> between numbers.

Ok, I'm with you.

> So, someone who does not believe in philosophical zombies, does not
> need the step 8 (the Movie Graph Argument MGA), because arithmetical
> truth does contains the computation describing, well, for example this
> very discussion we have here and now.

Ok, so I guess that would be my position *grin* - I think that all
states have a form of mentality - maybe not full consciousness, but

> For me the MGA is needed because I don't want to rely on the non
> existence of zombie.


What I still don't get is why you associate mental states only with
_true_ statements. Why not with false ones? Would that not be more in
line with a plenitude-like theory?

False states could encode very weird psychic experiences (dreams for
instance or whatever...)

>> I follow you that 1st person is recoverable by a 3rd person number
>> theoretic description - or better, OMs are - but how would a zombie
>> come
>> about? Can you give an example?
> Just consider the computation which correspond to your actual real
> life. That computation is encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in the
> Universal Deploiement, which is itself encoded (indeed an infinity of
> times) in the set of all arithmetical truth. All right?

Agreed in principle (with my question of why only true sentences thrown in)

>such a > computation would define an arithmetical version of you, and would
> constitute a phisophical (indeed arithmetical) zombies.

Ok, I think it would not be a zombie - already once we accept _comp_ -
maudlin notwithstanding; I think Maudlin saw his argument rather as
causing a problem for _comp_

> If you define the zombies as having a "material" body, then it is

I would say a zombie is a creature which behaves exactly like X but does
not have mental states, but X has mental states.

Best Wishes,

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Received on Thu Nov 06 2008 - 12:52:00 PST

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