But I do think the nature of conscious qualia, as an abstract system, is
interesting and non-trivial. Each person is their own universe - there is
something more to feelings than just a neuron lighting up, they are part of
an integrated dynamic.
2008/11/2 Brent Meeker <meekerdb.domain.name.hidden>
>
> Michael Rosefield wrote:
> > I think there's so many different questions involved in this topic
> > it's going to be hard to sort them out. There's 'what produces our
> > sense of self', 'how can continuity of identity be quantified', 'at
> > what point do differentiated substrates produce different
> > consciousnesses', 'can the nature of consciousness be captured through
> > snapshots of mental activity, or only through a dynamic interpretation
> > taken over a period of time?'... and it's far too late for me to
> > attempt to unravel all that!
> >
> > My feeling, though, is that once you've managed to assign some
> > informational entity as being a conscious mind, then you could track
> > it through time.
> But notice that everything you say about paths and variables and
> measure, apply to any system. Saying it is a conscious process doesn't
> change anything.
>
> My guess is that eventually we'll be able to create AI/robots that seem
> as intelligent and conscious as, for example, dogs seem. We'll also be
> able to partially map brains so that we can say that when these neurons
> do this the person is thinking thus and so. Once we have this degree of
> understanding and control, questions about "consciousness" will no
> longer seem relevant. They'll be like the questions that philosophers
> asked about life before we understood the molecular functions of living
> systems. They would ask:Where is the life? Is a virus alive? How does
> life get passed from parent to child? The questions won't get
> answered; they'll just be seen as the wrong questions.
>
> Brent
> "One cannot guess the real difficulties of a problem before having
> solved it."
> --- Carl Ludwig Siegel
>
> > If you tweaked some physical variables, then much like a monte carlo
> > simulation you could see potential paths it could follow. Given enough
> > variables and tweaking, you might be able to fully populate the
> > state-space according to what question we're asking, and it would seem
> > to me to be all about measure theory. Of course, this doesn't say
> > anything yet about any characteristics of the conscious mind itself,
> > which is undoubtedly of importance.
> >
> >
> >
> > 2008/11/2 Brent Meeker <meekerdb.domain.name.hidden
> > <mailto:meekerdb.domain.name.hidden>>
> >
> >
> > What are you calling "the process" when you've made two copies of it?
> >
> > Bretn
> >
> > Michael Rosefield wrote:
> > > But, given that they are processes, then by definition they are
> > > characterised by changing states. If we have some uncertainty
> > > regarding the exact mechanics of that process, or the external
> > input,
> > > then we can draw an extradimensional state-space in which the
> > degrees
> > > of uncertainty correspond to new variables. If we can try and place
> > > bounds on the uncertainty then we can certainly produce a kind of
> > > probability mapping as to future states of the process.
> > >
> > >
> > > 2008/11/2 Brent Meeker <meekerdb.domain.name.hidden
> > <mailto:meekerdb.domain.name.hidden>
> > > <mailto:meekerdb.domain.name.hidden <mailto:meekerdb.domain.name.hidden>>>
> > >
> > >
> > > Kory Heath wrote:
> > > > On Oct 31, 2008, at 1:58 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >> I think this problem is misconceived as being about
> > probability of
> > > >> survival.
> > > >>
> > > >
> > > > In the case of simple teleportation, I agree. If I step into
> a
> > > > teleporter, am obliterated at one end, and come out the
> > other end
> > > > "changed" - missing a bunch of memories, personality traits,
> > > etc., it
> > > > doesn't seem quite correct to ask the question, "what's the
> > > > probability that that person is me?" It seems more correct
> > to ask
> > > > something like "what percentage of 'me' is that person?"
> > And in
> > > fact,
> > > > this is the point I've been trying to make all along - that
> we
> > > have to
> > > > accept some spectrum of cases between "the collection of
> > molecules
> > > > that came out is 100% me" and "the collection of molecules
> > that came
> > > > out is 0% me".
> > > >
> > > > The idea of probability enters the picture (or seems to)
> > when we
> > > start
> > > > talking about multiple copies. If I step into a teleporter,
> am
> > > > obliterated, and out of teleporter A steps a copy that's
> > 100% me and
> > > > out of teleporter B steps a copy that's 10% me, what's the
> > best
> > > way to
> > > > view this situation? Subjectively, what should I believe
> > that I'm
> > > > about to experience as I step into that teleporter? It's
> > hard for me
> > > > not to think about this situation in terms of probability
> > - to think
> > > > that I'm more likely to find myself at A than B. It's
> > especially
> > > hard
> > > > for me not to think in these terms when I consider that,
> > in the case
> > > > when the thing that ends up in teleporter A is 100% me and
> > the thing
> > > > that ends up in teleporter B is 0% me, the answer is
> > unambiguous: I
> > > > should simply believe that I'm going to subjectively
> > experience
> > > ending
> > > > up in teleporter A.
> > > >
> > > > I'm sympathetic to the argument that it's still not
> > correct to frame
> > > > this problem in terms of probability. But I don't
> > understand how
> > > else
> > > > to frame it. How do you (Brent) frame the problem?
> > Subjectively,
> > > what
> > > > should I expect to experience (or feel that I'm most likely
> to
> > > > experience) when I step into a teleporter, and I know that
> > the thing
> > > > that's going to come out Receiver A will be 100% me and
> > the thing
> > > > that's going to come out of Receiver B will be 10% me?
> > > >
> > > > -- Kory
> > > >
> > > The way I look at it, there is no "I". Kory-A and Kory-B
> > are just two
> > > different processes. We can ask how similar each one is to
> > the Kory
> > > that stepped into the teleporter, but there's no fact of the
> > matter
> > > about which one is *really* Kory. And there's no sense to the
> > > question
> > > of what "I should expect to experience" because "I" is
> > nothing but a
> > > process of experiencing anyway. We could make up some legal
> > rule
> > > (which
> > > we would need if there really were teleporters) but it would
> > have
> > > to be
> > > based on it's social utility, not ontology.
> > >
> > > Brent
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > >
>
>
> >
>
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Received on Sun Nov 02 2008 - 07:09:12 PST