What are you calling "the process" when you've made two copies of it?
Bretn
Michael Rosefield wrote:
> But, given that they are processes, then by definition they are
> characterised by changing states. If we have some uncertainty
> regarding the exact mechanics of that process, or the external input,
> then we can draw an extradimensional state-space in which the degrees
> of uncertainty correspond to new variables. If we can try and place
> bounds on the uncertainty then we can certainly produce a kind of
> probability mapping as to future states of the process.
>
>
> 2008/11/2 Brent Meeker <meekerdb.domain.name.hidden
> <mailto:meekerdb.domain.name.hidden>>
>
>
> Kory Heath wrote:
> > On Oct 31, 2008, at 1:58 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
> >
> >
> >> I think this problem is misconceived as being about probability of
> >> survival.
> >>
> >
> > In the case of simple teleportation, I agree. If I step into a
> > teleporter, am obliterated at one end, and come out the other end
> > "changed" - missing a bunch of memories, personality traits,
> etc., it
> > doesn't seem quite correct to ask the question, "what's the
> > probability that that person is me?" It seems more correct to ask
> > something like "what percentage of 'me' is that person?" And in
> fact,
> > this is the point I've been trying to make all along - that we
> have to
> > accept some spectrum of cases between "the collection of molecules
> > that came out is 100% me" and "the collection of molecules that came
> > out is 0% me".
> >
> > The idea of probability enters the picture (or seems to) when we
> start
> > talking about multiple copies. If I step into a teleporter, am
> > obliterated, and out of teleporter A steps a copy that's 100% me and
> > out of teleporter B steps a copy that's 10% me, what's the best
> way to
> > view this situation? Subjectively, what should I believe that I'm
> > about to experience as I step into that teleporter? It's hard for me
> > not to think about this situation in terms of probability - to think
> > that I'm more likely to find myself at A than B. It's especially
> hard
> > for me not to think in these terms when I consider that, in the case
> > when the thing that ends up in teleporter A is 100% me and the thing
> > that ends up in teleporter B is 0% me, the answer is unambiguous: I
> > should simply believe that I'm going to subjectively experience
> ending
> > up in teleporter A.
> >
> > I'm sympathetic to the argument that it's still not correct to frame
> > this problem in terms of probability. But I don't understand how
> else
> > to frame it. How do you (Brent) frame the problem? Subjectively,
> what
> > should I expect to experience (or feel that I'm most likely to
> > experience) when I step into a teleporter, and I know that the thing
> > that's going to come out Receiver A will be 100% me and the thing
> > that's going to come out of Receiver B will be 10% me?
> >
> > -- Kory
> >
> The way I look at it, there is no "I". Kory-A and Kory-B are just two
> different processes. We can ask how similar each one is to the Kory
> that stepped into the teleporter, but there's no fact of the matter
> about which one is *really* Kory. And there's no sense to the
> question
> of what "I should expect to experience" because "I" is nothing but a
> process of experiencing anyway. We could make up some legal rule
> (which
> we would need if there really were teleporters) but it would have
> to be
> based on it's social utility, not ontology.
>
> Brent
>
>
>
>
> >
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Received on Sat Nov 01 2008 - 22:24:07 PDT