I'd love to make a serious comment at this point, but every one I can think
of involves "I am Spartacus" jokes. Sorry.
2008/11/1 Brent Meeker <meekerdb.domain.name.hidden>
>
> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > 2008/10/31 Brent Meeker <meekerdb.domain.name.hidden>:
> >
> >> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> >>
> >>> Hi,
> >>>
> >>> 2008/10/31 Kory Heath <kory.domain.name.hidden>:
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> On Oct 30, 2008, at 3:58 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> Of course the point is that you're not the same "you"
> >>>>> from moment to moment in the sense of strict identity of information
> >>>>> down to the
> >>>>> molecular level, or even the neuron level.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> I agree, but that doesn't change the point I was trying to make. If
> >>>> the collection of molecules that comes out the other end of the
> >>>> teleporter is not identical to me, but it's as much like me as any
> >>>> normal future collection of molecules that I change into moment-by-
> >>>> moment, then I believe that my identity "completely survived" the
> >>>> teleportation. (In the same sense that I "completely survive" an
> >>>> average day of my normal life.) If the collection of molecules that
> >>>> comes out the other end of the teleporter is a puddle of goo, I
> >>>> believe that my identity completely failed to survive the
> teleportation.
> >>>>
> >>>> My point is that "completely survived" and "completely failed to
> >>>> survive" cannot be the only two possible cases. If it was, we'd be
> >>>> left with the absurd conclusion that there's a single molecule of
> >>>> difference between cases in which I completely survive and cases in
> >>>> which I completely fail to survive.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>> Why is this absurd ? You are composed of a finite number of
> >>> molecule... it seems therefore logical that between you still feel as
> >>> yourself and there is no more you... there is only one bit of
> >>> difference.
> >>>
> >>> Regards,
> >>> Quentin Anciaux
> >>>
> >>>
> >> Why is "feeling yourself" dichotomous? What if you feel and act as
> >> usual but you think your name is "Kory" instead of "Quentin". What if
> >> you remember the childhood of Bruno as yours and you are very
> >> knowledgeable about modal logic.
> >>
> >> Brent Meeker
> >>
> >
> > Well if I'm Kory or Bruno, I'm not me...
> You distorted my hypothetical. Could you not still be you and simply
> have the mistaken notion that your name is "Kory"? If your earliest
> childhood memories were replaced by Bruno's, would you cease to exist?
>
> > And if my grandma had b...
> > her name would be grandpa.
> >
> > If consciousness is information and feeling being an 'I' (and also a
> > particular 'I')
>
> I think that is a false intuition. I don't believe that you directly
> feel being Quentin Anciaux, it is a memory and an inference made up of
> many bits of information. You are not feeling it at every moment, but
> only when you think about "Who I am." at which time an appropriate name
> and life history comes to mind.
>
> Brent
>
> > is information and indeed a finite length
> > information... then one bit of difference and I'm not me... anything
> > else but me.
> >
> > Regards,
> > Quentin
> >
> >
>
>
> >
>
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Received on Fri Oct 31 2008 - 23:09:54 PDT