Le 30-oct.-08, à 19:11, Michael Rosefield a écrit :
> At some point, doesn't it just become far more likely that the
> teleporter just doesn't work? I know that might seem like dodging the
> question, but it might be fundamentally impossible to ignore all
> possibilities.
In which theory? What are your hypothesis? If the teleporter does not
work, it means comp is false. Of course that is possible. The point
here is that IF comp is true THEN naturalism is wrong.
Nobody says that comp is true. On the contrary I can explain why IF
comp is true, then comp is theological, it needs an act of faith. No
machine can really know she is a machine.
Now, if your theory is that comp is false, it is ok. Comp is my working
hypothesis. I use it because you can transform philosophical question
into scientific question. My point is that comp is refutable in Popper
sense.
Bruno Marchal
>
>
> 2008/10/30 Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
>>
>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>> 2008/10/30 Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>:
>>>
>>>> The seven first steps of the UD Argument show this already indeed,
>>>> if
>>>> you accept some Occam Razor. The movie graph is a much subtle
>>>> argument
>>>> showing you don't need occam razor: not only a machine cannot
>>>> distinguish real from virtual, but cannot distinguish real from
>>>>
>>>> mind to understand why the movie graph argument is necessary to
>>>> complete the proof, so I rarely insist. Maudlin's 1989 paper can be
>>>> said answering to the "counterfactual- objection" against the MGA
>>>> (Movie-Graph Argument).
>>>
>>> Bruno, I'm not sure why you de-emphasise step 8 of the UDA. The other
>>> steps are relatively straightforward and uncontroversial compared to
>>> step 8. People who encounter the argument will naturally ask, how can
>>> you have a computation without a computer or a mind without a brain?
>>> I
>>> think I understand your reasoning (and Maudlin's) here, but it needs
>>> to be spelled out if the UDA is not to be dismissed on the grounds
>>> that it proves nothing about reality, assumed to be at the bottom
>>> level comprised of hard physical objects.
>>
>> Stathis, you see I cannot doubt about consciousness, so I can doubt
>> only matter, and my research is in big part motivated by explaining
>> what is matter without taking granted it exists or what it can be,
>> i.e. my goal consists in explaining matter from non material entities
>> which I can understand; like numbers and simple sets (of numbers). It
>> took some time for me to realize that most people really take the
>> existence of matter for granted. But then what is it? Despite
>> appearance, physics never relies on the materialist assumption,
>> except in the background, as an excuse for not dwelving into what
>> they take, with Aristotle, as metaphysics. Physical theories are
>> mathematical theories, with conventional and relative "unities". To
>> invoke "matter" as an explanation for actuality or reality seems to
>> me as erroneous as using the notion of God for justifying the
>> creation. At the origin, the Movie Graph Argument (MGA) was an
>> attempt to explain the mind body problem once we assume comp, and to
>> show the difficulties of the notion of matter to the materialists.
>> But your remark is fair enough, and eventually we have to spelled out
>> all the details for having a proof or completely convincing argument.
>> I will try to build an argument developed through little steps; like
>> I have done for the UDA, but note that even for UDA it is rare people
>> tells the step where they stop to understand. We will see. I guess
>> sometimes that people are a bit anxious with those matter and I don't
>> want to push them too much. yet I am very glad you understand it, so
>> perhaps you will be able to help. I will send, in a new MGA thread, a
>> first step. OK. I will go slowly (if only because I am a bit busy).
>>
>>
>> You wrote also:
>>
>>>
>>> 2008/10/30 Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>:
>>>
>>>> To make a prediction on the future from the past you have to
>>>> remember
>>>> the past (or at least some relevant part of the past). If you allow
>>>> (partial) amnesia, it could depend on many things including the type
>>>> of computations allowing the amnesia: it makes almost no sense a
>>>>
>>>> (subjectively or as first person experience, like we have to do
>>>> assuming comp) when throwing a dice knowing in advance that once you
>>>> have thrown the dice you will forget that you have thrown the dice!
>>>> So I am not sure the question can even make sense. I said to George
>>>> Levy a long time ago (in this list) that all first person
>>>> probabilities in self-multiplication experiments presuppose that the
>>>>
>>>> and thus serendipitously given that we cannot known for sure our own
>>>> substitution level.
>>>
>>> Your teleportation thought experiments seem quite straightforward and
>>> intuitive to me: if I am copied to two separate locations, then I
>>> should have a 1/2 first person probability of finding myself in one
>>> or
>>> other location. We can assume for the sake of the experiment that
>>> the
>>> copying is close enough to perfect, and dismiss the possibility that
>>> the copies will be zombies. So, will the probability of finding
>>> myself
>>> in each location still be 1/2 if one of the copies is perfect but the
>>> other is 99% or 50% or 1% faithful, by whatever criterion you care
>>> to
>>> define these percentages?
>>
>> Hmmm... Sometime ago I would have refuse to answer this question. I
>> know that for the exact and precise derivation of physics from
>> computer (mathematical) science, we need to be able to answer this,
>> but my point has never been to derive physics from comp, it consists
>> just to explain why, assuming comp, we *have to* derive physics from
>> comp (independently of the difficulty of the task).
>> But ok, perhaps I have make some progress lately, and I will answer
>> that the probability remains invariant for that too. The probability
>> remains equal to 1/2 in the imperfect duplication (assuming 1/2 is
>> the perfect one).
>> But of course you have to accept that if a simple teleportation is
>> done imperfectly (without duplication), but without killing you, the
>> probability of surviving is one (despite you get blind, deaf, amnesic
>> and paralytic, for example). OK? What do you think?
>> Sometimes ago I would have equate total amnesia with death, but I
>> have change my mind on this. What is your opinion on this, doctor?
>>
>> Note also that eventually the measure of uncertainty are not really
>> probabilities but coefficient of credibility. They don't compose
>> transitively. The notion of probability can be used only for the
>> immediate experience, despite they are defined by a weight on, most
>> probably, infinite histories (for not getting paradoxes we have
>> already discussed).
>>
>> - Bruno Marchal
>>
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> >
>
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list.domain.name.hidden
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe.domain.name.hidden
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
Received on Fri Oct 31 2008 - 07:07:07 PDT