On 30 Oct 2008, at 07:51, Kory Heath wrote:
>
>
> On Oct 28, 2008, at 12:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Measure theory is the branch of math which has been invented to
>> tackle
>> those infinities, and those similarity relations.
>
> I don't know much about measure theory. I understand a bit about how
> it's supposed to tackle those infinities, but I don't understand how
> it relates to similarity relations.
OK, measure theory theory does not relate directly to the similarity
relations. This happens with the comp hyp through indiscernability
relations. Indeed you cannot distinguish the computations which differ
below the level of substitution, like you cannot distinguish your
state of mind you would have if some electron has this or that
position within the same energy level. The measure on first person
histories has to take this equivalence into account. But we cannot
know our level, we can only make some empirical bets. Strictly
speaking the equivalence relation is not constructive. We don't really
can know who we are, and the probabilities cannot be defined with
certainty. If some probability calculus works well, empirically, it
would give evidences (not proof) for some level, and if QM can be
extracted from comp, this would mean that empirical quantum mechanics
would assess the idea that, roughly speaking, our level of
substitution is given by the position of our particles up to the
Heisenberg uncertainiy relations. The quantum indeterminacy would, in
that case directly results directly from the 1-person comp
indeterminacy, but we don't yet know this. That would be nice because
the empirical many-world (the empirical reasons for not believing in a
collapse of the wave packet) would comfort the fact that we share
histories (given that we can share the quantum indeterminacy). Quantum
Mechanics would really be a non-solipsistic first person *plural*
indeterminacy calculus, and physical reality as we know it today,
would really be the product of dream sharing. QM would comfort that we
belong to the same "matrix".
> What bearing does it have on the
> case when you make exactly two copies of a person, one which is exact
> and one which contains (say) roughly half of that person's memories,
> personality, or whatever?
To make a prediction on the future from the past you have to remember
the past (or at least some relevant part of the past). If you allow
(partial) amnesia, it could depend on many things including the type
of computations allowing the amnesia: it makes almost no sense a
priori. It would be like asking what is probability to get six
(subjectively or as first person experience, like we have to do
assuming comp) when throwing a dice knowing in advance that once you
have thrown the dice you will forget that you have thrown the dice!
So I am not sure the question can even make sense. I said to George
Levy a long time ago (in this list) that all first person
probabilities in self-multiplication experiments presuppose that the
level of substitution (of brain material) has been chosen correctly,
and thus serendipitously given that we cannot known for sure our own
substitution level.
Now, your question could still make sense if you accept the idea that
there is only one person possible. We would all be the same person in
different context. With this you can predict that amnesia would be
lived as a remembering of your more correct identity. Unfortunately
record of amnesia by wounded person does not confirm this, except,
apparently for some drug induced amnesia, like the one provoked by the
use of the plant salvia divinorum (there are many reports available on
the net). So it looks like some type of amnesia (which belong to some
type of computation) could confirm "we are the same person", and in
that case, those amnesia would not change the probability rules. But
all this is much more speculative so I conjure you to take this with a
bit of a distance. Of course if you are lucky to belong to a country
where the consumption of salvia divinorum is authorized, you could
test it on yourself but read the manual before and be cautious. I have
tested it and I do find the effect very interesting for learning
things about identity and reality, but not to the point of having get
any definite conclusion. It certainly opens me to be more interested
in the amnesia phenomenon, and it makes me more open to the "only one
person" proposition, but it is not a sort of knowledge easily
sharable, except, well like consciousness, through sharing identical
brain transformation, which of course is very hazardous when they are
produce through the use of some chemicals (but still less hazardous
than using an hammer on your skull or getting a car accident).
The day will come (not tomorrow) where we will bet on some effective
artificial brain, and this will lead to more systematic way to handle
such questions in much less hazardous way. The hazardous part will be
put entirely in the bet on our substitution level.
To sum up my comment: probability of self-multiplication with loss of
memory depends most probably on the way such memories are deleted.
The fact that some drugs give a "remembering" feeling through amnesia
could be an evidence that Darwinian evolution (by itself very long
computations) has handled brain/identity recuperation mechanism, and
that we share a personal identity. Some mystic describes similar
experiences.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Received on Thu Oct 30 2008 - 04:59:49 PDT