I would say time doesn't go forward it is only a subjective illusion that it
moves forward because whatever observer moment you find yourself
experiencing only has memories of past events. Therefore a conscious
observer about to be injected with a poison will forever exist in that
moment, just as that same observer 5 minutes prior will forever exist in the
moment 5 minutes prior.
Many worlds and other everything-exists theories suggest that all possible
observer moments exist, therefore for any observer moment X, (including one
where one is about to be poisoned) there exist observer moments Y for which
X is a memory. Y can come about in strange ways, perhaps X was just a
dream, or was in a universe where the doctor used the wrong medication. X
could even be from a simulation in an advanced role playing game where Y is
an observer who was playing such a game.
Though some of these Y's are improbable, as the chance of successively
escaping death decreases, (perhaps as the doctor realizes he used the wrong
dose, and retries) eventually these rare Y's become more likely extensions
of X.
Jason
On Thu, Oct 23, 2008 at 11:18 AM, Michael Rosefield
<rosyatrandom.domain.name.hidden>wrote:
> OK, sorry, upon re-reading it seems that you're asking whether diverged
> branches of consciousness can reconverge, and what that implies.
>
> I'd say that since consciousness is rather 'forgetful', vague and
> high-level, there's an awful lot of scope for this. However, once
> reconverged there's no distinguishing between them - 'that which makes no
> difference is no difference.' It means that they share their
> underlying-possible-universes set and are just one branch again.
>
> 2008/10/23 Michael Rosefield <rosyatrandom.domain.name.hidden>
>
> I don't think I follow you. This is the exact feeling I get when I try to
>> read Pynchon...
>>
>> OK, I think what you're saying is that when it comes to reconstructing the
>> body with only knowledge of the mind itself, much of the exact physical
>> characteristics are ambiguous, in that they don't contribute directly and
>> are at best simply part of a set of possible underlying forms, and that this
>> even goes for many low-level brain functions.
>>
>> If that's the case, I entirely agree.
>>
>> 2008/10/23 John Mikes <jamikes.domain.name.hidden>
>>
>> Stathis,
>>> Who told YOU (and the other honored discutants in this thread) that
>>> *THIS* ONE of our existence is the one-and-only basic/original appearance?
>>> We, here and now, may be #37 for you and #49 for me etc.,
>>> -- B U T --
>>> could you please tell me if 'anyone' of this nightmare-topic remembers,
>>> or has knowledge of any other appearance of his SAME person (anywhere?) by
>>> QTI?
>>> If not, what else is the entire thread based on except for Everett's
>>> ingenious idea and the continuation of his line? (No matter how many
>>> matching equations could be drawn in the topic).
>>>
>>> Do we abide by a 'physical world' (Bruno?) in which a QTI transfers
>>> *material* with diseases, brain-damages, limbic pain and love-connections?
>>>
>>> Have fun in science (but with reason?)
>>>
>>> John Mikes
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Oct 22, 2008 at 6:51 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp.domain.name.hidden
>>> > wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> 2008/10/22 razihassan <RaziHassan1.domain.name.hidden>:
>>>>
>>>> > 2) I'd like to propose a thought experiment. A subject has his brain
>>>> > cells removed one at a time by a patient assistant using a very fine
>>>> > pair of tweezers. The brain cell is then destroyed in an incinerator.
>>>> >
>>>> > Is there a base level of consciousness beyond which, from the pov of
>>>> > the subject, the assistant will be unable to remove any more cells,
>>>> > since conscious experience will be lost? ie is there a minimum level
>>>> > of 'experience' beyond which nature will appear to act to always
>>>> > maintain the physical brain?
>>>> >
>>>> > If there is, does the second law of thermodynamics not suggest that
>>>> > all brains inexorably head towards this quantum of consciousness, for
>>>> > as long as our brains are physical?
>>>>
>>>> The problem you raise is one of personal identity, and can be
>>>> illustrated without invoking QTI. If I am copied 100 times so that
>>>> copy #1 has 1% of my present memories, copy #2 has 2% of my present
>>>> memories, and so on to copy #100 which has 100% of my present
>>>> memories, which copy should I expect to end up as, and with what
>>>> probability? What about if there are a million instantiations of copy
>>>> #1 and one instantiation of the rest? What if there are 10^100^100
>>>> instantiations of copies with 1/10^100 of my present memories - as
>>>> there well might be?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>
> >
>
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Received on Thu Oct 23 2008 - 14:16:29 PDT