Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2008/8/15 Brent Meeker <meekerdb.domain.name.hidden>:
>
>
>> But that assumes there can be a computation independent of any material
>> realization - a computation that never has an error. Real computations
>> are realized by quantum mechanical devices. Of course they may be so
>> large and hot that they are to a very good approximation classical (the
>> brain is according to Tegmark). But I'm supposing that the complexity
>> of conscious computation (and remember we are talking about simulating
>> the environment, not just the brain) is so great that quantum effects
>> are inevitable.
>>
>
> The model of the mind this implies is a digital computer with a random
> component. But even if this random component is truly random rather
> than pseudorandom, you could always emulate it with a branching
> algorithm that explores every possible case. It might be
> computationally very expensive, but given enough memory and enough
> time it could be done.
>
That's one of those "in-principle" arguments that may not hold in
reality. The combinatorial explosion of possibilities would quickly
exceed the capacity of any realizable computer. Keep in mind that the
computer must simulate a fair piece of the universe - not just the
brain. But I'm not clear on the implication here. Is it enough that
the two consciousness are identical for a moment?
Brent Meeker
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Received on Fri Aug 15 2008 - 13:16:25 PDT