Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

From: Brent Meeker <meekerdb.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2008 17:56:33 -0700

Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2008/8/15 Brent Meeker <meekerdb.domain.name.hidden>:
>
>> But suppose we can create an AI, but we can't produce copies that don't
>> diverge immediately; perhaps a consequence of the quantum no-cloning
>> theorem. I realize that's probably not the case since it would require
>> that computation of the complexity to produce consciousness must include
>> so essentially quantum aspect. But would that imply "1st person
>> indeterminacy" or not?
>>
>> Brent Meeker
>>
>
> If mind is a computation, we can copy it. Computation is numbers to
> numbers in finite "time" and deterministic rules. I've put "time" in
> quotes because time can be a rule and not something inherent to
> computation.
>
> Computation can only diverges if the computation is not the same
> and/or input is not the same. Computation is a deterministic thing not
> something you could play with.
>
> Regards,
> Quentin Anciaux
>

But that assumes there can be a computation independent of any material
realization - a computation that never has an error. Real computations
are realized by quantum mechanical devices. Of course they may be so
large and hot that they are to a very good approximation classical (the
brain is according to Tegmark). But I'm supposing that the complexity
of conscious computation (and remember we are talking about simulating
the environment, not just the brain) is so great that quantum effects
are inevitable.

Brent Meeker

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Received on Thu Aug 14 2008 - 20:56:52 PDT

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