Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

From: 1Z <>
Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2008 12:51:55 -0700 (PDT)

On 14 Aug, 17:56, GŁnther Greindl <> wrote:
> Hi,
> 1Z wrote:
> > It doesn't have to explain it on the basis of apriori axioms. Standard
> > cosmology accepts
> > that many features fo the universe stem from contingent, essentially
> > unaccountable boundary conditions.
> Well, actually these strangely "contingent" conditions are what leads to
> discussions of the "everything" sort - here, we want to explain these
> contingents also (or say why they are not explainable).

Yes, you do. But if you can't explain things on a no-axiom basis --
and it is
difficult to see how you could, give that all deductive arguments
start from some premise or another--
then that approach is not advantageous.

> Also, in standard cosmology you have the problem of duplicate "yous" in
> remote parts of the infinite universe.

Standard cosmology is neutral about the (in)finity of the universe.
Also, the more extreme WR/HP
universes are forbidden because even in the MW versions of standard
cosmology, worlds are constrained by the laws of physics. That is: I
might just see a unicorn or a pixie, but I will never see a cold fire
or a hovering rock.

> Again, you have the indetermincy
> problem - here maybe even without turing emulable minds.

I don't see why. Even assuming the unknown and contingent issue of the
infinity of the universe,

a) I have the same consciousness in the same perceived environment, in
which case the indeterminacy is
is indetectible and trivial


b) I have the same (momentary) consciousness in different
environments, in which
case divergence will quickly follow.

> It depends if you believe in duplication or unity of conscious experience.
> Cheers,
> GŁnther
> --
> GŁnther Greindl
> Department of Philosophy of Science
> University of Vienna
> Blog:
> esis:
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Received on Thu Aug 14 2008 - 15:52:55 PDT

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