Le 30-juil.-08, à 15:26, Stathis Papaioannou wrote :
> Yes, I was partially agreeing with you. Psychotic people often still
> manage very well with deductive reasoning, but they get the big
> picture wrong, obviously and ridiculously wrong. So there must be more
> to discovering truth about the world than mere algorithmic shuffling.
Deduction and computation are different thing.
Computability is closed for diagonalization, and this makes it
possible to
have an universal notion of computability (Church thesis)
Deductibility is not closed for diagonalization, this makes
deductibility notions
never universal and always incomplete.
It is a theorem of computer science that machine learning and
discovering truth
is beyond deductibility, but not necessarily beyond computability, and
still less
beyond computability viewed from the first person point of view.
Also, assuming comp, the first person associated to the machine, cannot
see itself as a machine at all (cf the unawareness of the
reconstitution delay in
the UDA and its consequences), making any self-aware machine directly
connected to non computable entities having indeed the shape, in a
first approximation,
of many (2^aleph_0) interfering realities.
I recall that with the mechanist assumption there are too much non
computational
entities a priori observable: the white rabbits.
I agree with Mark about aesthetics. Platonist have Beauty in high
considerations.
But given that machine already cannot define truth, it would be weird
that we can analyse beauty
in term of procedure. On the contrary we have all reasons to believe
that the mechanist
hypothesis prevent any complete analysis of higher order notion like
beauty
definable. As I said often the comp or mechanist assumption is, after
Godel, a vaccine
against reductionism. Even the truth about only the numbers can no
more be capture
completely in term of numbers.
Also, John says:
> > Could Bruno imagine to define it [beauty] in numbers? (excuse me
> please the humor).
I cannot. But I can explain why there exists a lot of things
that a machine cannot explain in term of numbers. All this without
postulating more
than numbers (together with addition and multiplication) at the ontic
level.
Just remember that having only numbers at the ontic level forces the
inside
epistemological view to escape the numbers.
If not you are collapsing first and third person view, like reducing a
human
person to her body.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Received on Mon Aug 04 2008 - 09:53:29 PDT