Dear Bruno,
- CRH implies COMP
- COMP implies the negation of CRH
> Universality, Sigma_1 completeness, m-completness, creativity
>(in Post sense), all those equivalent notion makes sense only through
>complementary notion which are strictly sepaking more complex (non RE,
productive, ...).
>The self-introspecting universal machine can hardly miss the inference
of such "realities",
> and once she distinguishes the 1, 1-plural, 3-person points of view,
she has to bet on
>the role of the non computable realities (even too much getting not
just randomness,
>like QM, but an hard to compute set of anomalous stories
> (white rabbits, coherent but inconsistent dreams).
Why does the machine have to bet on these complementary non-RE
histories? I do not quite see how this arises from 1 and 1-plural POV;
after all, it could be just rec. enumerable continuations?
Schmidhuber's/Tegmarks Computable Universe Hypothesis seems very
attractive: it gives rise to structure, _evolves_ self-aware
sub-structures, and gives reasonable (?) measure, for instance
Schmidhuber's speed prior.
This also takes care of the white rabbit.
> It's a bit like "understanding" (putting in a RE set) the (code of) the total computable
> functions, forces us to accept the existence of only partially
computable functions,
>which sometimes (most of the time, see the thesis by Terwijn) have a
non recursive domain.
> OK, the ontic part of a comp TOE can be no *more* than Sigma_1 complete,
>but a non self-computable part of Arithmetical truth and analytical
truth,
>is needed to get the *internal* measure, we can't even give a name
>to our first person plenitude and things like that.
I think this answers part of my question above. The ontic part is only
the Sigma_1 complete stuff; we assume the others for our measure - but
my claim is that they do not give rise to first person experience.
I think the central question is this: _what_ does the Arithemetic Truth
of whatever simulate? Reality at a granular level (like in the CA
approach, Zuse's Rechnender Raum) - that is what I would assume - that
reality at the lowest level is a number-relation; but that awareness
only arises in these domains as a higher oder abstraction.
I think you assume that the Sigma_1 sentences give the OMs directly, is
that correct? So in your view there is no underlying reality; QM and
stuff like that is only an "illusion". Am I correct in how I interpret
your theory?
> Perhaps this is why the Intelligible has been discovered (Plato) before the "ONE"
>(Plotin). It is far bigger. With comp you can restrict the ontic to
the Universal Machine
> (the baby ONE),
Ok, I'm with you this far.
> but its intelligible realm is well beyond its grasp.
For me, the intelligible can be only a (proper?) subset of the ontic.
How could something that does not exist (ontic) be intelligible? Or
would you say that this is mathematical imagination?
> All this is related to the fact, already understood by Judson Webb,
>that comp is truly a vaccine against reductionist theories of the mind.
I have the Webb book on my desk and have glanced occasionally inside, it
looks like a wonderful book, but I have not yet had the time to study
it in detail.
But I wonder - why do you say that comp is not reductionist? For me comp
is reductionist - mind as the working of computation (I am pro
reductionist, that is not a negative word in my view).
So, two questions:
1) At what level do your Sigma_1 sentence operate? OM's directly (I
would interpret your paper in this way) or low level (more like a
classical physical/digital physics view)?
2) You say that the ontic part is computable (in this sense, I would say
COMP does _not_ refute CRH?) Because what "is" that is not ontic? That
would be contradiction in terms?
Cheers,
Günther
--
Günther Greindl
Department of Philosophy of Science
University of Vienna
guenther.greindl.domain.name.hidden
http://www.univie.ac.at/Wissenschaftstheorie/
Blog: http://dao.complexitystudies.org/
Site: http://www.complexitystudies.org
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Received on Tue May 06 2008 - 15:20:43 PDT