Surely consciousness is both granular (much of what we are conscious of is
pre-processed by the brain and body, and not part of our direct experience.
This gives a huge amount of leeway for underlying ambiguity) and limiting
(two people holding hands or talking do not become one conscious entity). If
we say this is a strict equality then we dilute the meaning of consciousness
beyond usefulness. Conscious-space being a subset of computational-space
seems more reasonable.
On 28/03/2008, Jason <jasonresch.domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>
>
> To expand on Günther's question: If we equate computational states
> with mind states as COMP assumes, and if this universe is computable,
> would that imply the universe itself can be considered a singular
> mind? I think this is a consistent viewpoint not contradicted by
> experience. Of course I don't know what you, or anyone else is
> experiencing right now but that is only due to a lack of communication
> and accessibility. If you take a normal brain and cut the link
> between hemispheres you create two separate minds, but are they not
> the same mind only limited in transfer of information? What if we
> grafted nerve fibers between two individual's brains so they could
> share thoughts and experiences, two minds can become one via
> communication. Since all particles in this universe are interacting,
> the computational history of a mind must include the whole universe,
> or at least what is in its light cone for a given extent of time. If
> this universe is one mind, then the universal dovetailer would be a
> maximally conscious omega point, conscious of everything that can be
> perceived.
>
> Jason
>
> On Mar 25, 7:35 am, Günther Greindl <guenther.grei....domain.name.hidden>
> wrote:
>
> > Dear Bruno,
> >
> > I have used the Easter holidays to read again through your SANE 2004
> > paper, and I have a question regarding step 7.
> >
> > (I am fine with step 1-6, step 8 seems OK but I will withhold judgment
> > until I understand step 7 ;-)
> >
> > The things I am unclear about are:
> > 1) maximally complete computational histories going through a state ->
> > what are these?
> >
> > 2) Why do they correspond to _consistent_ extensions, and how do you
> > define these consistent extensions (in a normal logical way -> no
> > contradiction; or differently?)-
> >
> > 3) And how do you treat the Boltmann brain issue which crops up in
> > modern cosmology but also in a UD generating _all_ computational
> histories?
> >
> > Cheers,
> > Günther
> >
> > --
> > Günther Greindl
> > Department of Philosophy of Science
> > University of Vienna
>
> > guenther.grei....domain.name.hidden
> .athttp://www.univie.ac.at/Wissenschaftstheorie/
>
> >
> > Blog:http://dao.complexitystudies.org/
> > Site:http://www.complexitystudies.org
> >
>
--
"They couldn't hit an elephant at this dist-"
Last words of Gen. John Sedgwick, spoken as he looked out over the parapet
at enemy lines during the Battle of Spotsylvania in 1864.
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Received on Thu Mar 27 2008 - 20:32:43 PDT