Re: Malcom/Standish white rabbit solution

From: Alastair Malcolm <amalcolm.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Mon, 24 Mar 2008 13:40:58 -0000

----- Original Message -----
From: "Russell Standish" <lists.domain.name.hidden>
To: <everything-list.domain.name.hidden>
Sent: Friday, March 21, 2008 1:30 AM
Subject: Re: Malcom/Standish white rabbit solution


>>
>> Comparing identical OM's/OM sequences, it seems to me that I am most
>> likely
>> to be ['in'] that sequence of OM occurrences that is in one of the
>> simplest universes that can produce them (cet. par.). (Reason given
>> below.)
>
> You are assuming a measure over all histories, rather than birth
> moments or observer moments.

No. Please see below.

>This is a rather different SSA than has
> been usually proposed (ASSA or RSSA). I can see a possible connection here
> to
> the Schmidhuber II approach (measure over programs), but it is
> contradictory to either the Marchal dovetailer (subjective
> indeterminism) or my all strings approach (which I consider to be
> essentially just starting from the dovetailer trace UD* and assuming a
> uniform prior on the strings).
>


>> In your 'Why Occam's Razor' paper, sect 2, following a discussion of the
>> Schmidhuber ensemble and the Universal Prior, it is stated "If we assume
>> the
>> self-sampling asssumption [...t]his implies we should find ourselves in
>> one
>> of the simplest (in terms of C-0[Complexity of description x]) possible
>> universes capable of supporting self-aware substructures (SASes). This is
>> the origin of physical law...".
>
> The SSA refers to birth moments. The "universe" is sort of code for
> the history up to that point in time. The White Rabbit problem
> concerns what happens after that point in time.
>
> An assumption of a noumenal reality is enough, of course, to eliminate
> white rabbits in conjunction with the arguments in section 2 of Why
> Occams Razor. But noumenal reality has its own set of problems,
> including being incompatible with quantum facts, something that Bruno
> has been at pains to point out.

If your 'noumenal reality' is the same as the 'compressed ('u')reality' I
use in my paper, I can't see where it has any more of a problematical
relationship with (say) mwi qm than the basic physicalist approach does.
(Neither can I find any references to noumen* and qm/quantum together in the
everything archives by Bruno. If by 'noumenal reality', you just mean
materialism, that's a different kettle of fish.)

>
> What I find is that most explanations requiring noumenal reality can
> also be explained by simply assuming the anthropic principle. It is
> possible that the AP suffices to banish white rabbits also. However,
> the AP becomes a little mysterious without noumenal reality, which I
> do discuss at several points in my book. It remains, IMHO, an unsolved
> problem.
>
>> If one takes the description string x (up to
>> some finite limit) as (minimally) representing a universe (and from which
>> OM's are derived), then application of your equivalence class method
>> should
>> solve the WR problem directly (check out my roughly equivalent method at
>> www.physica.freeserve.co.uk/pa01.htm) - this hopefully answers your point
>> above about the origin of our being almost certainly in one of the
>> simplest
>> SAS-supporting universes: the premise can be all logically possible
>> universes (or just 'entities'), some or all of which are representable by
>> description strings (say).
>
> Its been a while since I read your paper, but IIRC it was largely a
> paraphrase of the same argument I put in section 3 of Why Occams Razor.

Re-reading this section under the interpretation provided in your recent
email (where you talk about phenomenally cohering OM's) convinces me that
you are saying something fundamentally different. Your section 2 is
certainly closer - I previously assumed from other comments that you were
taking it as read that any minimal specification of an OM (eg via a program,
description string etc) would have to implicitly include all the OM's in
that universe - that is the simplicity that a TOE is aiming for. The
'cohering OM's' are then automatically catered for - they are part of the
same representing description string (or whatever represents them). This
would then coincide with my own approach: the measure is taken over (say)
bit strings minimally representing all possible relevant universes (or just
'entities', since minimal universe representations are assumed to provide
the simplest representations of normal OM's), and not over 'histories'.

>
>> (From other comments I earlier assumed this is
>> what you were actually doing - it seems our ideas in this area are
>> significantly different after all.)
>>
>
> It seems to me that you have changed your interpretation of the SSA
> (there's nothing wrong with changing your mind, but its always worth
> trying to dig into the foundations) as mentioned above.

I don't think I have, but it does seem that misinterpretations like the one
above have led to misunderstandings of our respective views. I would just
like to reiterate that what is in my paper does not correspond to the ideas
expressed in section 4.2 of 'Theory of Nothing'.

Alastair

>
> --
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Mathematics
> UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpcoder.domain.name.hidden
> Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> >

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Received on Mon Mar 24 2008 - 09:40:57 PDT

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