Re: RE : Re: Discussion of the MUH

From: Bruno Marchal <>
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2008 14:49:11 +0100

Le 05-mars-08, à 16:11, <> a écrit :

> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> To tackle the math of that "physical bord", I use the Godel Lob
>> Solovay modal logic of provability (known as G, or GL).
> Can you derive any known (or unknown) physical laws from your theory?

I am not sure we could ever *know* a physical law, but of course we can
believe or bet on some physical theory, and make attempt to refute it
(Also it is not *my *theory, but the
Pythagoras-Plato-Milinda-Descartes-Post-Church-Turing theory, that is,
the very old mechanist theory just made precise through digitalness).

But, yes, that digital theory makes possible to derive
verifiable/refutable propositions:

-existence of many "physical" histories/worlds, and some of their
indirect effects.
-verifiability of the many interference of the probabilities for any
isolated observable when we look to "ourselves" at a level below the
substitution level.
-observable non locality in the same conditionS.
- non booleanity of what the observables can describe (sort of Kochen
Specker phenomenon)
- It explains and predicts the first person (plural) indeterminacy (I
don't know any simplest explanation of how indeterminacy can occur in a
purely deterministic global context btw).
(+ the first person expectation like the comp-suicide and its quantum
suicide counterparts, etc.)

Of course, the problem is that, *a priori* the theory predicts too
much: the white rabbits, like I sum up usually. But then I show that
the incompleteness constraints (a one (double) diagonalization
consequence of Church thesis) explains why the presence of white
rabbits in that context is not obvious at all. If they remains, after
the math is done, then the comp hyp is refuted.

The main advantage of this approach is that (unlike most physicalist
program) the person cannot be eliminated, and the mind body problem
cannot be put under the rug. Somehow my contribution consists in
showing that the mind body problem, once we assume the computationalist
thesis is two times more difficult than without, because it leads to a
matter problem, under the form of the white rabbit problem, or, as
called in this list, the (relative) measure problem.
Do you know french? All this is explained in all details (perhaps with
too much details) in *Conscience et Mécanisme":

My "result" (not *my* theory) is that evidences accumulate in favor of
Plato's conception of matter (contra the primary matter of Aristotle).
See my Plotinus paper for more precision on this:

> or something that could be checked experimentally?

There is a possibility of stronger form of Bell's inequality. To
progress on this open problem you have to study the arithmetical
quantum logics I am describing in most of my papers. Eric Vandenbusch
has solved the first open problem, but a lot remains. But my modest
result is that with comp, we *have to* extract physics (the
Schroedinger equation), not a proposal of a derivation, just a reason
why we must do that, and a proposal of a path (the Loebian interview)
for doing that.

What is your opinion about Everett? You can see my reasoning as an
application of Everett's natural idea that a physicist obeys the
physical laws in the mathematician/mathematics realm (or just
arithmetics, combinators, etc.). I can understand that people in
trouble with Everett can be in trouble with the comp hyp and its

My *type* of approach consists in just illustrating that Mechanism has
empirically verifiable consequences.
*My* theory of everything, deduced from the comp hyp is just (Robinson)
arithmetic: all the rest emerge from internal points of view. They are
similar (formally or 'relationaly') to Plotinus' hypostases.


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Received on Thu Mar 06 2008 - 08:49:19 PST

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