Re: White Rabbits and QM

From: Russell Standish <>
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 1999 10:37:54 +1100 (EST)

Thanks for these comments Bruno. I have finally braved the dragons of
another university's library and borrowed Challas's book on Modal
logic. You notation stumped me when I read your thesis before.

I was pleased to find modal logic seems to merely be a parallel version
of ordinary logic - well suited to Many Worlds type theories (maybe
that's simplifying things too far, but hopefully good enough to
appreciate your arguments). As being well versed in parallel
programming languages (eg C* or HPF), the mental step of understanding
the expressions does not appear to be too bad.

I will need to reread your thesis and white rabbit paper before
commenting on your criticisms much more. However, I'm a little
surprised by your following comment, because it seems to me that I
solved the WR problem in first person only. (Not that I started out
trying to do this). Maybe I'm solving a different WR problem :)


> Russell Standish wrote (in his recent paper p.2):
> > <<We assume the *self-sampling assumption*, essentially
> > that we expect to find ourselves in one of the
> > universes with greatest measure, subject to the
> > constraints of the anthropic principle. This implies
> > we should find ourselves in one of the simplest
> > possible universes capable of supporting self-aware
> > substructures (SASes). This is the origin of physical
> > laws ....>>
> This is only the "third-person" formulation of the problem.
> Even if you succeed to explain the absence of white rabbit
> from that particular form of SSA (self-sampling assumption)
> then, with comp, there are still reason to expect the
> apparition of the rabbit FROM A FIRST PERSON POINT OF VIEW.
> It seems that you have not seen the point in the UDA. You
> are still linking the first person univocally to his
> third person describable body.
> Chris Malloney alludes to an explanation power of the
> computational indeterminacy, but the truth is that
> A PRIORI the computational indeterminacy is so strong that
> it looks like a refutation of comp. The UDA shows that with
> comp there are more rabbits to be expected.
> I could summarize my critics to your strategy (and
> Schmidhuber's one) in the following way:
> You will perhaps explain the absence of third-person view
> of rabbits, but you will still not explain the absence
> of first-person view of rabbits.
> I am not saying your strategy is incorrect, I am saying
> it is not enough. Like some physicist you are still keeping
> completely the mind-body problem under the rug.
> Remember that (especially) with comp you cannot associate so
> easily mind/consciousness with matter/physical-process.
> This follows from either UDA + OCCAM, or from the movie graph
> alias Maudlin's argument (cf archive).
> Bruno

Dr. Russell Standish Director
High Performance Computing Support Unit,
University of NSW Phone 9385 6967
Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965
Room 2075, Red Centre
Received on Thu Nov 18 1999 - 15:36:41 PST

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.3.0 : Fri Feb 16 2018 - 13:20:06 PST