Oops: replace Newton's demon by Maxwell's demon.
George
George Levy wrote:
> Hi Bruno,
> Yes I am still on the list, barely trying to keep up, but I have been
> very busy. Actually the ball was in my court and I was supposed to
> answer to your last post to me about a year ago!!!. Generally I agree
> with you on many things but here I am just playing the devils'
> advocate. The Maudlin experiment reminds me of an attempt to prove the
> falsity of the second law of thermodynamics using Newton's demon. As
> you probably know, this attempt fails because the thermodynamics
> effect on the demon is neglected when in fact it should not be The
> Newton Demon experiment is not thermodynamically closed. If you
> include the demon in a closed system, then the second law is correct.
> Similarly, Maudlin's experiment is not informationally closed because
> Maudlin has interjected himself into his own experiment! The
> "accidentally" correctly operating machines need to have their tape
> rearranged to work correctly and Maudlin is the agent doing the
> rearranging.
>
> So essentially Maudlin's argument is not valid as an attack on
> physical supervenience. As you know, I am at the extreme end of the
> spectrum with regards the physical world supervening on consciousness.
> (Mind over matter instead of matter over mind), so I would very much
> like to see an argument that could prove it, but in my opinion
> Maudlin's does not cut it. More comments below.
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>Hi George,
>>
>>Are you still there on the list?
>>I am really sorry to (re)discover your post just now, with a label
>>saying that I have to answer it, but apparently I didn't. So here is
>>the answer, with a delay of about one year :(
>>
>>
>>
>>Le 08-oct.-06, à 08:00, George Levy wrote :
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>Finally I read your filmed graph argument which I have stored in my
>>>computer. (The original at the Iridia web site
>>>http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume3CC/3%20%202%20.pdf
>>>is not accessible anymore. I am not sure why.)
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>>Apparently it works now. You have to scroll on the pdf document to see
>>the text.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>In page TROIS -61 you describe an experience of consciousness which is
>>>comprised partially of a later physical process and partially of the
>>>recording of an earlier physical process.
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>>Right.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>It is possible to resolve the paradox simply by saying that
>>>consciousness involves two partial processes ...
>>>
>>>
>>
>>Why? With comp, consciousness can be associated with the active boolean
>>graph, the one which will be recorded. No need of the second one.
>>
>>
>>
> Yes, but in the eyes of a materialist but I have restored the
> possibility that consciousness can supervene on the physical. I have
> exposed Maudlin's trickery. I agree that consciousness can be
> associated with a boolean graph and that there is no need for physical
> substrate. However, Maudlin does not prove this case because he got
> involved in his own experiment.
>
>>>... each occupying two
>>>different time intervals, the time intervals being connected by a
>>>recording, such that the earlier partial process is combined with the
>>>later partial process, the recording acting as a connection device.
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>>But is there any sense in which consciousness can supervene on the
>>later partial process? All the trouble is there, because the later
>>process has the same physical process-features than the active brain,
>>although by construction there is no sense to attribute it any
>>computational process (like a movie).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>I am not saying that consciousness supervene on the physical substrate.
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>>ok.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>All I am saying is that the example does not prove that consciousness
>>>does not supervene the physical.
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>>Yes, you are right from a logical point of view, but only by assuming
>>some form of non-computationalism.
>>With comp + physical supervenience, you have to attach a consciousness
>>to the active boolean graph, and then, by physical supervenience, to
>>the later process, which do no more compute. (And then Maudlin shows
>>that you can change the second process so that it computes again, but
>>without any physical activity of the kind relevant to say that you
>>implement a computation. So, physical supervenience is made wrong.
>>
>>
>>
>
> Yes but Maudlin cheated by interjecting himself into his experiment.
> So this argument does not count.
>
>>>The example is just an instance of
>>>consciousness operating across two different time intervals by mean of
>>>a
>>>physical substrate and a physical means (recording) of connecting these
>>>two time intervals.
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>>The problem is that with comp, consciousness has to be associated to
>>the first process, and by physical supervenience, it has to be attached
>>also to the second process. But then you can force the second process
>>to do the correct computation (meaning that it handles the
>>counterfactuals), without any genuine physical activity (reread Maudlin
>>perhaps, or its translation in term of filmed graph like in chapter
>>trois of "Conscience et Mécanisme").
>>
>>So, postulating comp, we have to associate the many possible "physical
>>brains" to a type of computation, and not the inverse.
>>
>>Does this help?
>>
>>
> No. Maudlin cheated. Sorry.
>
> George
>
> >
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Received on Thu Oct 04 2007 - 00:56:20 PDT