On 05/07/07, Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden> wrote:
BM: OK. I would insist that the "comp project" (extract physics from comp)
is really just a comp obligation. This is what is supposed to be shown
by the UDA (+ MOVIE-GRAPH). Are you OK with this. It *is*
counterintuitive.
DN: I believe so - it's what the reductio ad absurdum of the 'physical'
computation in the 'grandma' post was meant to show. My version of the
'comp obligation' would then run as follows. Essentially, if comp and
number relations are held to be 'real in the sense that I am real', then to
use Plato's metaphor, it is numbers that represent the forms outside the
cave. If that's so, then physics is represented by the shadows the
observers see on the wall of the cave. This is what I mean by 'independent'
existence in my current dialogue with Torgny: i.e the 'arithmetical realism'
of numbers and their relations in the comp frame equates to their
'independence' or self-relativity. And the existence of 'arithmetical
observers' then derives from subsequent processes of 'individuation'
intrinsic to such fundamental self-relation. Actually, I find the equation
of existence with self-relativity highly intuitive.
BM: Then, the interview of the universal machine is "just" a way to do the
extraction of physics in a constructive way. It is really the
subtleties of the incompleteness phenomena which makes this interview
highly non trivial.
DN: This is the technical part. But at this stage grandma has some feeling
for how both classical and QM narratives should be what we expect to emerge
from constructing physics in this way.
BM: There is no direct (still less one-one) correlation between the mental
and the physical,
that is the physical supervenience thesis is incompatible with the comp hyp.
[A quale of a pain] felt at time t in place x, is not a product of the
physical activity of a machine, at time t in place x. Rather, it is the
whole quale of [a pain felt at time t in place x] which is associated
with an (immaterial and necessarily unknown) computational state, itself
related to its normal consistent computational continuations.
<snip>
Comp makes the "yes doctor" a gamble, necessarily. That is: assuming the
"theory comp" you have to understand that, by saying yes to the doctor, you
are gambling on a level of substitution. At the same time you make a
"gamble" on the theory comp itself. There is double gamble here. Now, the
first gamble, IF DONE AT THE RIGHT COMP SUBSTITUTION LEVEL, is
comp-equivalent with the natural gamble everybody do when going to sleep, or
just when waiting a nanosecond. In some sense "nature" do that gamble in our
place all the time ... But this is somethjng we cannot know, still less
assert in any scientific way, and that is why I insist so much on the
"theological" aspect of comp. This is important in practice. It really
justify that the truth of the "yes doctor" entails the absolute fundamental
right to say NO to the doctor. The doctor has to admit he is gambling on a
substitution level. If comp is
true we cannot be sure on the choice of the subst. level.
DN: ISTM that a consequence of the above is that the issue of 'substitution
level' can in principle be 'gambled' on by cloning, or by evolution (because
presumably it has been, even though we can't say how). But by engineering
or design??? Would there ever be any justification, in your view, for
taking a gamble on being uploaded to an AI program - and if so, on the basis
of what theory? Essentially, this is what I've been trying to get at. That
is: assuming comp, HOW would we go about making a 'sound bet', founded on a
specific AI theory, that some AI program instantiated by a 'physical'
computer, will equate to the continuity of our own observation?
The second question I have is summarised in my recent posts about 'sense and
'action'. Essentially, I've been trying to postulate that the correlation
of consciousness and physics is such that the relations between both sets of
phenomena are a necessary entailment, not an additional assumption. ISTM
that this is essential to avoid all the nonsense about zombies. And not
only this, but to show that the reciprocity between experience - e.g.
suffering - and behaviour (indeed the whole entailment of 'intentionality')
is a necessary consequence of fundamental self-relation (arithmetical
relations, in the comp frame). Now, my attempt to do this has been to
postulate that 'sense' and 'action' are simply observer-related aspects of a
non-decomposable fundamental self-relation, which in the comp frame would
equate to a set of number-relations. But ISTM that for this to be true, the
observer and physical narratives would somehow need to follow an 'identical'
or isomorphic trajectory for their invariant relation to emerge in the way
that it seems to. Do you think that this idea has any specific sense or
relevance in the comp frame?
BM: Does this help? I assert some propositions without justifying them,
because the justification are both already on the list, or in my
papers. But, please, don't hesitate to ask for more if interested. From
what I understand about your intuition, you are quite close to the
"natural first person discourse" of the lobian machine. And the closer
you are, the more severe my comments will be on the details, so please
indulge my critical way of talking ...
Yes, absolutely! I feel I'm making progress in resolving some of the
ambiguity in my understanding, so be as severe as necessary, cher maitre.
David
> Le 05-juil.-07, à 02:40, David Nyman a écrit :
>
> > On 03/07/07, Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> >
> > > But it might then be
> > > questioned how observer and physical narratives could somehow
> > > 'converge' on a common or consistent environmental interface as a
> > > result of any form of co-evolution. Such a notion would seem to imply
> > > that equivalent selection effects could be operating on both
> > > environments despite their orthogonal orientation. It is not
> > > immediately apparent why this should be so.
> >
> > As far as I understand, this is *the* problem. It seems insoluble
> > untill you take into account explicitly the incompleteness phenomenon
> > which put high constraint of what sound machines can believe, bet,
> > observe, feel ... (that what the hypostases are all about).
> >
> > DN: On reflection, I have something else to ask about this. If I
> > have understood, the comp project is to give an account, as you say,
> > of what emerges from interviewing (computationally) sound machines
> > about their beliefs, bets, observations, feelings etc.
>
>
>
>
> OK. I would insist that the "comp project" (extract physics from comp)
> is really just a comp obligation. This is what is supposed to be shown
> by the UDA (+ MOVIE-GRAPH). Are you OK with this. It *is*
> counterintuitive.
>
> Then, the interview of the universal machine is "just" a way to do the
> extraction of physics in a constructive way. It is really the
> subtleties of the incompleteness phenomena which makes this interview
> highly non trivial.
>
>
>
>
> > In other words, the maximal description of their mental and physical
> > worlds that is possible under such constraints. What would still be
> > indeterminate would be exactly how a specific machine's account could
> > be correlated with a physical description of the machine itself: i.e.
> > the perennial 'mind-body problem'. But do you believe that there can
> > be a way of closing this question theoretically? Is comp agnostic to
> > this correlation being 'functional' or 'physical'?
>
>
> I think that the interview provides the best we can hope concerning the
> mind-body problem in the comp frame. This could still currently lead to
> a refutation of comp in case empirical facts contradicts the
> comp-physics (the physics extracted from comp). There is no direct
> (still less one-one) correlation between the mental and the physical,
> that is the physical supervenience thesis is incompatible with the comp
> hyp.
> [A quale of a pain] felt at time t in place x, is not a product of the
> physical activity of a machine, at time t in place x. Rather, it is the
> whole quale of [a pain felt at time t in place x] which is associated
> with an (immaterial and necessarily unknown) computational state,
> itself related to its normal consistent computational continuations.
>
>
> > Or will 'yes doctor' remain always a gamble in the sense of "you
> > picks your theory and you takes your choice"?
>
> Hmmm... It is hard to answer this. Comp makes the "yes doctor" a
> gamble, necessarily. That is: assuming the "theory comp" you have to
> understand that, by saying yes to the doctor, you are gambling on a
> level of substitution. At the same time you make a "gamble" on the
> theory comp itself. There is double gamble here.
> Now, the first gamble, IF DONE AT THE RIGHT COMP SUBSTITUTION LEVEL, is
> comp-equivalent with the natural gamble everybody do when going to
> sleep, or just when waiting a nanosecond. In some sense "nature" do
> that gamble in our place all the time ... But this is somethjng we
> cannot know, still less assert in any scientific way, and that is why I
> insist so much on the "theological" aspect of comp. This is important
> in practice. It really justify that the truth of the "yes doctor"
> entails the absolute fundamental right to say NO to the doctor. The
> doctor has to admit he is gambling on a substitution level. If comp is
> true we cannot be sure on the choice of the subst. level.
>
> Comp predicts that machine will be more and more "dizzy" when either
> introspecting themsleves close enough, or by looking at nature close
> enough. The math predicts even thresholds and jumps in that endeavor.
>
> Does this help? I assert some propositions without justifying them,
> because the justification are both already on the list, or in my
> papers. But, please, don't hesitate to ask for more if interested. From
> what I understand about your intuition, you are quite close to the
> "natural first person discourse" of the lobian machine. And the closer
> you are, the more severe my comments will be on the details, so please
> indulge my critical way of talking ...
>
> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
> >
>
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Received on Thu Jul 05 2007 - 11:31:25 PDT